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 ABSTRACT 
 
Performance Persistence of  
Institutional Investors in IPO Market: 
Evidence from China 
by 
LIU Sibo 
Master of Philosophy 
 
Using a dataset consisting of complete bid information for 477 bookbuilt IPOs that 
took place during Nov 2010 to Oct 2012 in China, I examine whether the 
performance of institutional investors demonstrates persistence in the IPO market. 
Building on the adverse selection model as developed by Rock (1986) and a two-
period analysis, I develop three hypotheses and obtain empirical results that are 
consistent with the hypotheses. Firstly, I find that the performance of institutional 
investors continues into the next period. Secondly, I find that the performance 
persistence exists only for the investors with good past performance but not for 
investors with bad past performance. Finally, an index capturing the past 
performance of institutional investors is shown to be informative about the IPO’s 
initial and medium-term post-market returns. Overall, the results are consistent with 
the existence of performance persistence among the institutional investors. I conduct 
additional tests to trace the roots of the observed performance persistence. Results 
support the hypothesis that institutional investors with good past performance are 
relatively more informed than those with bad past performance. Specifically, 
investors with good past performance are more likely to participate in issues with 
high underpricing, exhibit stronger bid shaving ability, provide more information in 
terms of high elasticity of demand curve, and show a weaker tendency of naïve 
reinforcement learning. The results are robust after controlling for the influence of 
underwriters and after ruling out different alternative explanations. Taking all the 
results together, my study provides the first systematic evidence on the performance 
persistence of institutional investors in the IPO market. The results provide 
important insights for understanding the role of institutional investors in the IPO 
process and have implications for the design of IPO methods. 
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PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE OF  
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN IPO MARKET: 
EVIDENCE FROM CHINA 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The existence of performance persistence among institutional investors has been 
intensively debated over the past two decades (Busse et al. 2010). This issue is 
important because the evidence has significant implications on the market 
efficiency hypothesis and also contains valuable indicative information for 
investors. Some studies document that some institutional investors consistently 
outperform others. As such, the past performance of institutional investors provides 
valuable information about these investors’ quality and future performance 
(Grinblatt & Titman 1992; Brown & Goetzmann 1995). Nevertheless, other studies 
argue that the performance persistence is caused by the existence of momentum 
effects instead of heterogeneous skills of institutional investors (Carhart 1992, 
1997). The existing studies have been focused mainly on the performance of 
institutional investors in the secondary market and none of them has investigated 
the performance persistence of institutional investors in the IPO market. The IPO 
market is fundamentally different from the secondary market in terms of the 
information and trading environment (Sherman & Titman 2002). As a result, 
evidence obtained from the institutional investors in the secondary market cannot 
be automatically generalized to the IPO setting, because the expertise and skills 
required by institutional investors in these two markets are likely to be different. In 
this study, I try to fill this gap in the literature by using a dataset of complete bid 
information in China to investigate whether institutional investors demonstrate 
performance persistence in the IPO market. 
 
The theoretical root of performance persistence in the IPO market can be traced to 
the seminal paper written by Rock (1986). As an asymmetric information-based 
model of underpricing, Rock’s adverse selection model suggests the existence of 
information heterogeneity among investors in the IPO market. Specifically, 
investors in his model are divided into an informed group and an uninformed group. 
Informed investors who have undertaken costs to determine the true value of IPO 
shares will subscribe to the shares only if they are underpriced and therefore offer a 
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positive return on their investment. Uninformed investors, in contrast, subscribe to 
IPO shares indiscriminately and earn a zero expected return on average. As a result, 
there is a positive performance gap between the informed and uninformed 
investors. If the mix of informed and uninformed investors remains largely stable 
over time, I expect to observe that the performance gap between informed and 
uninformed investors persists over time. Furthermore, if performance persistence 
exists, the past performance of investors who have participated in the subscription 
of an IPO can provide valuable indicative information about the performance of the 
new shares. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, performance persistence among institutional 
investors in the IPO market has not yet been documented in the literature. I believe 
that the paucity of the research on this important issue is largely due to two reasons. 
Firstly, in the typical bookbuilding process, performance of institutional investors is 
heavily influenced by underwriters’ discretions in share allocation. As shown by 
prior studies that examine performance persistence of institutional investors in the 
secondary market, the performance of investors in secondary market can be 
captured by using data on the quantities and prices of the stocks that these investors 
have bought and sold in the market. Unlike the secondary market where 
institutional investors can buy and sell stock at prevailing market prices, the 
successful buying of stocks in IPO market is constrained by the subscription and 
share allocation mechanisms in which underwriters can exercise substantial 
discretion. For example, Binay et al. (2007) found that underwriters enjoy 
substantial discretion in share allocation when a bookbuilding method is used and 
they tend to exercise their discretion to allocate more shares to their favored 
institutional investors. Ritter & Zhang (2007) also provide evidence that the 
underwriter tends to allocate hot IPOs to its affiliated funds. As a result, measuring 
the performance of institutional investors in the IPO market by using data on the 
shares that have been actually obtained by the institutional investors from IPOs may 
not accurately capture these investors’ incentives and performance, unless the 
influences of underwriters can be mitigated. 
 
The second hurdle for investigating performance persistence in IPO market is data 
availability (Degeorge et al. 2010). A full set of bidding information is needed (both 
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participation and bid information) for each investor in order to discern the 
incentives and abilities of the institutional investors in IPO markets, such as their 
participation decision and bid shaving ability (Sherman 2005; Field & Lowry 2009; 
Chiang et al. 2010; Chiang et al. 2011). IPO bid-level data are not available in US 
and Europe markets1. Existing studies have relied on data obtained from the private 
sources (e.g. investment banks), which usually contains a small sample of issues 
(Aggarwal et al. 2002). 
 
China, the largest emerging market, provides a valuable testing ground for two 
reasons. Firstly, new shares in China during our investigation period are required to 
be allocated to two tranches of investors separately: the institutional tranche and 
retail tranche. The method of allocation for the institutional tranche in China has a 
distinctive and has a valuable feature: the share allocation is not determined by 
underwriter but on the basis of pro rata and lottery. In addition, the IPO regulations 
prevent institutional investors that are affiliated to the underwriter from 
participating in the bidding process. Therefore, the confounding influences due to 
underwriters’ discretion over share allocation are likely to be mitigated. Secondly, 
the regulations in China require the underwriters to release the full set of bidding 
information to the public before the first-day trading commences. Thus, we are able 
to obtain a dataset that consists of complete bid information for 477 bookbuilt IPOs, 
which is much larger than the sample size employed by most prior studies. 
 
Building on information heterogeneity of investors as suggested by Rock (1986), I 
propose three hypotheses using a two-period framework. Firstly, I expect that the 
performance of institutional investors is persistent. That is, investors who perform 
well (poorly) in the first period will continue to perform well (poorly) in the second 
period. Secondly, the performance of investors who performed well in the first 
period will show persistence but no such pattern can be observed for the investor 
who performed poorly. Thirdly, I further hypothesize that there is a positive relation 
between the past performance of institutional investors who have participated in an 
IPO and the IPO’s initial and subsequent returns. 
 
                                                       
1 Data on the participations of institutional investors in US bookbuilt IPOs has been obtained from private 
sources, as used in Chemmanur et al. (2010). 
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My empirical analysis yields consistent results. I find that the performance of 
institutional investors continues into the next period. Such a pattern exists for 
investors with good past performance but cannot be found for ones with bad past 
performance. Moreover, an index capturing the past performance of institutional 
investors involved in the bidding process of an IPO is shown to be informative 
about the IPO’s initial and medium-term post-market returns. I conduct additional 
tests to trace the roots of the observed performance persistence. Results appear to 
support the hypothesis that institutional investors with good past performance are 
informed. Specifically, investors with good past performance are more likely to 
participate in issues with high underpricing2, exhibit stronger bid shaving ability, 
provide more information in terms of the elasticity of demand curve, and are less 
prone to naïve reinforcement learning. 
 
I attribute the observed performance persistence to the information heterogeneity of 
institutional investors. However, there are several alternative explanations for my 
findings. Firstly, although the underwriters in the Chinese markets cannot enjoy 
discretion in share allocation, they can intentionally discount the offer prices to 
favor certain institutional investors through pricing discretion as in the auctioned 
IPOs in US (Degeorge et al. 2010). Furthermore, some institutional investors can 
achieve good performance by correctly anticipating the underwriters’ pricing 
strategy and participate in IPOs with greater price discounts. To mitigate the 
influence caused by underwriter’s discount policy, I include a control variable to 
measure the extent of the price discounts offered by underwriters. In addition, I also 
use a control variable to capture the number of IPOs involving the same pair of 
investor-underwriter (that is the participation of an investor in IPOs with the same 
underwriter). The results indicate that all our results still hold when the pricing 
discount and investor-underwriter connection have been controlled. 
 
Secondly, the release of bidding information by some large and reputable 
institutional investors may grab the attention of retail and institutional investors. 
Thus, the IPOs subscribed to by some specific institutional investors may 
                                                       
2 In this thesis, I use the term “underpricing” and “initial return” interchangeably. 
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experience greater buying pressures on their first day of trading and thus result in 
higher initial returns. Under this circumstance, high initial returns earned by certain 
institutional investors are not due to their better stock picking abilities, but because 
their bidding information has triggered positive sentiment among other investors 
(Barber & Odean 2008). To control for this possibility, I adopt the method in Da et 
al. (2011) and construct an abnormal search volume index (ASVI) to capture the 
changes in market-wide attention on an IPOs after its bidding information has been 
released. My results are still retained after this variable has been included in the 
regressions. 
 
Thirdly, the evidence of performance persistence may be caused by investors who 
consistently submit high bids or low bids. Specifically, in my current definition of 
performance, submissions of bids below offer price will generate zero return, while 
institutional investors submitting high bids will obtain an initial return. Given that 
the initial returns are on average positive, consistently submitting high bids or low 
bids could possibly generate the performance persistence that I have documented. I 
therefore construct two variables to capture the submission of high bids and low bids. 
However, the inclusion of these two variables does not affect my results. 
 
Lastly, I further test whether the information heterogeneity of investors is due to 
industry-specific expertise or to more generic skills or knowledge. My results suggest 
that the performance gap is more likely to be driven by generic skills and knowledge 
rather than industry-specific expertise. 
 
My study has both academic value and practical relevance: Firstly, this study  
provides first systematic evidence on the performance persistence of institutional 
investors in the IPO market. This provides a useful addition to the extant literature 
on performance persistence of institutional investors (Carhart 1992; Grinblatt & 
Titman 1992; Brown & Goetzmann 1995; Carhart 1997; Busse et al. 2010).  My 
study shows that performance persistence may exist not only in the secondary   
market but also in the IPO market. This calls for more future research on this 
important issue within the context of the IPO market. My study offers evidence on 
the existence of performance persistence when IPO shares are allocated through a 
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bookbuilding method where underwriters have no discretion. As IPO shares can be 
allocated under different IPO methods, it is important to examine whether 
performance persistence can also be observed under each method. For instance, it is 
interesting to investigate whether performance persistence can also be seen in the 
typical US bookbuilding method where underwriters have discretion in share 
allocation. It is also worthwhile to identify the possible causes for the persistence 
under those circumstances (if there are any). Furthermore, my evidence is obtained 
from an emerging market where the information environment tends to be opaque    
and institutional investors are less experienced than those in mature markets. As a 
result, further studies are needed to verify my findings by using data obtained from 
mature markets. 
 
Secondly, my study also contributes to the general literature on the role of 
institutional investors in the IPO market. To begin with, the existing studies tend to 
assume that institutional investors in the IPO market are homogeneous and equally 
informed while retail investors are uninformed (Rock 1986; Chiang et al. 2010).  
Such an assumption has been challenged by some scholars such as Ljungqvist   
(2007), who argues that “it cannot be ruled out that the information asymmetry is 
most severe within groups, rather than between institutional and retail investors”.    
Yet so far, the co-existence of informed and uninformed investors within the group 
of institutional investors has not been systematically investigated. My study is the 
first one to investigate whether the information sets of institutional investors in IPO 
market are heterogeneous and how such heterogeneity may affect the performance  
of institutional investors. My evidence on performance persistence confirms the 
existence of information heterogeneity among institutional investors in the market, 
which enhances our understanding of the information environment of the IPO   
market. My results also call for more future research to further identify the possible 
sources of the information heterogeneity and examine the effects of such   
information heterogeneity on other aspects of IPO processes. 
 
In addition to academic value, my study also has implications for investors and the 
design of IPO methods. My results show that the participation of certain investors 
with good past performance may serve as a predictor for initial and subsequent 
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returns. From an investor’s point of view, the past performance of investors in the 
IPO market can provide investors with valuable information to capture superior 
returns. Based on the quartiles of the past performance of institutional investors, I 
find that the IPOs in the highest quartile have an average initial return of 32.2%, 
compared to just 13.6% for those in the lowest quartile. This economically large 
spread of 18.6% is robust after I control for the conventional predictors of initial 
returns. This spread is comparable to the performance difference associated with 
underwriter persistence as documented by Hoberg (2007). Specifically, Hoberg  
(2007) finds that the IPOs where their underwriters’ past initial returns are in the 
highest quartile have an average initial return which is 14.7% higher than that of the 
lowest quartile. In addition, institutional investors are expected to realize a 0.154% 
greater performance in the following period for every 1% performance achieved in 
the past period. The association is also comparable to that documented by Grinblatt 
& Titman (1992) for the institutional investors in the secondary market (0.24%). 
 
Furthermore, my findings can also have important implications for the design of the 
IPO method. Some recent studies have proposed that a hybrid-auction, which   
divides the investors into institutional and retail tranches and employ auction as the 
allocation mechanism, is a promising IPO method (Chiang et al. 2010; Jagannathan 
et al. 2010). This method can prevent the uninformed retail investors from 
introducing noises into the bidding process. The allocation method in China has all 
the characteristics of a hybrid-auction and provides a unique setting to explore its 
functioning and effectiveness. My study has at least two important practical 
implications on this proposed IPO method 3 . Firstly, my results show that   
institutional investors are not equally informed. Although the hybrid-auction system 
prevents the retail investors from introducing noises into the bidding process, the 
effectiveness of the system depends crucially on the quality of institutional     
investors in a financial market: whether the majority of the institutional investors    
are informed or uninformed. The existence of uninformed institutional investors can 
still introduce noises that are similar to those introduced by retail investors.    
Secondly, my study suggests that releasing the bidding information and the past 
                                                       
3 The proposed IPO method is to extract the valuable information from the institutional investors. In this study, 
I show that some institutional investors with good past performance is better informed. One aspect of the 
effectiveness of the method is that informed investors get compensated in the process of subscription. 
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performance of the bidders to the public helps to enhance the effectiveness of the 
system to improve the market efficiency, as the data contain valuable information 
about the value of the stocks that have recently listed. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 offers a literature 
review on the extant literatures on performance persistence and asymmetric 
information-based model of IPO underpricing. I discuss the institutional    
background and IPO mechanism of China in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the 
theoretical background and develops the hypotheses. Chapter 5 describes the core 
empirical results on the performance persistence of institutional investors. Chapter   
6 presents the additional analysis. Chapter 7 concludes. 
 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
In this chapter, I conduct a brief review on the related literature and explain how my 
study extends the prior literature. As performance persistence in the IPO market has 
not been documented by prior studies, the first set of related literature comes from 
the studies that examine performance persistence of institutional investors in the 
secondary market. The extensive studies in the past two decades generate mixed 
evidence on the existence of performance persistence among institutional investors 
(Busse et al. 2010). A number of empirical studies have demonstrated that the  
relative performance of mutual funds persists over time. For example, early    
evidence suggests that funds with good performance in the preceding year appear to 
obtain superior returns in the current year (Carlson 1970). While some studies   
present evidence that the performance of institutional investors shows persistence 
over the short-term horizons of one to three years (Hendricks et al. 1993;    
Goetzmann & Ibbotson 1994; Wermers 1999), other studies show that the   
persistence can last over the horizons of five to ten years (Grinblatt & Titman 1992; 
Elton et al. 1993; Elton et al. 1996). The performance persistence over a short term 
horizon has been attributed mainly to “hot hand” or common investment strategies 
(Hendricks et al. 1993), while the persistence over long-term horizon has been 
attributed to managers’ differential information or stock-picking talent (Elton et al. 
1993). Furthermore, it is also suggested that financial regulations, such as minimum 
9 
 
capital restrictions, can also give rise to performance persistence in the primary 
market (Cumming et al. 2012).  
 
Starting from Jensen (1969), some studies do not find solid evidence of     
performance persistence. For example, Carhart (1992, 1997) argues that the result    
of performance persistence is mostly driven by momentum effect. On the other     
hand, Lewellen (2011), argues institutional investors as a whole closely mimic the 
market portfolio and no evidence of stock-picking skill can be found by using the 
data obtained from the period of 1980 to 2007. Matallín-Sáez et al. (2014) also 
challenge the existence of performance persistence by showing that the evidence of 
performance persistence in mutual funds is not robust over the period 2001 to 2011. 
 
The prior studies on performance persistence have focused on secondary markets   
but not the IPO market. I believe that it is important to revisit this issue in the     
context of the IPO market for several reasons. Firstly, the information environment 
in the IPO market is different from that of that secondary market. Primary markets 
are well-recognized for having severe information asymmetry. Different opinions  
and beliefs about the value of IPO stocks are possible because there is no market 
price of corporate assets (Chemmanur & Krishnan 2012). The information opacity   
is further intensified due to availability of very limited public information on the    
IPO firms. The limited public information not only creates a significant information 
gap among different market participants and also reduces the abilities of financial 
institutions to conduct research to close the information gap. Such an information 
environment is very likely to lead to information heterogeneity among institutional 
investors, which in turn make performance persistence likely to occur in the market. 
 
Secondly, the existence of performance persistence represents a significant challenge 
to the efficient markets hypothesis and its evidence can provide valuable    
information for sophisticated investors to strategically generate superior returns and 
consequently improve market efficiency. The secondary market for newly listed 
stocks tend to be less efficient than secondary market for the stocks that have been 
listed for a long time, because there is more limited information available for newly 
listed stocks. Thus, evidence on performance persistence in the IPO market may 
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provide investors with a better chance to capture superior returns and consequently 
greater potential for improving the efficiency of the immediate post-IPO market. 
 
The second related literature is asymmetric information theories/models in the IPO 
literature. As I have discussed in the Introduction, the idea of information 
heterogeneity has been proposed by Rock (1986) in his adverse selection model. By 
assuming that some investors are better informed about the true value of the shares 
and bid only for attractively priced IPOs 4 , and assuming the uninformed bid 
indiscriminately (Ljungqvist 2007), Rock’s model implies that there will be a 
performance gap between the informed and uninformed investors, which could 
persist over time. 
 
Rock’s model has been extensively tested using data obtained from outside the U.S. 
(Koh & Walter 1989; Levis 1990; Keloharju 1993; Amihud et al. 2003) 5 . 
Nevertheless, the existing studies have focused on the information heterogeneity 
between institutional investors and retail investors rather than information 
heterogeneity among institutional investors. For instance, Chiang et al. (2010) 
conclude that institutional investors appear to be more informed. Aggarwal et al. 
(2002) show that institutional investors earn greater returns on their IPO allocations 
than do retail investors. 
 
In addition to Rock’s adverse selection model, there are also other asymmetric 
information-based models in the IPO literature, such as theories on IPO methods 
(Benveniste & Spindt 1989; Jagannathan et al. 2010) and information production 
theory (Sherman & Titman 2002). These studies attempt to test whether a group of 
investors are more informed than others by looking at the different behaviors of 
investors such as endogenous entry (Sherman 2005), bid shaving ability (Chiang et 
al. 2010), elasticity of demand curve (Kandel et al. 1999; Liu et al. 2001) and  
learning behaviors (Degeorge et al. 2010; Chiang et al. 2011), For example,   
Sherman (2005) shows that informed investors are more attracted by issues with 
                                                       
4 Attractively priced IPOs refer to IPOs with sufficient underpricing. 
5 Koh & Walter (1989) used IPO data from Singapore during the 1970s and 1980s. In this setting, the 
oversubscribed IPOs were allocated by random ballot, which is similar to the method used in China. Levis 
(1990) used data from the UK. Keloharju (1993) used data from Finland and Amihud et al. (2003) used data 
from Israel.  
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sufficient underpricing and thus endogenously more likely to participate in those 
IPOs. On the other hand, Liu et al. (2001) offer evidence to show that the  
participation of more informed investors will lead to a more elastic demand curve   
for an IPO. 
 
Similar to the empirical studies that test Rock (1986)’s model, studies on other 
information-based models have also focused only on the information heterogeneity 
between institutional investors and retail investors. Therefore, existing studies on    
the asymmetric information among investors in the IPO market offer no evidence    
on whether there are significant differences in information among institutional 
investors. My study offers systematic evidence to show that some institutional 
investors are in fact more informed than the others, which consequently leads to the 
existence of performance persistence 
 
Finally, my study is also related to the work of Hoberg (2007), which explores 
underwriter persistence phenomenon in the IPO market. The author provides 
evidence that initial IPO returns have a persistent underwriter-specific component, 
which has been attributed to information heterogeneity among underwriters. 
Specifically, a premium constructed on the basis of underwriter quality has been 
shown to have predictive power on initial returns. Underwriters and investors are    
the two major players in an IPO process. While Hoberg (2007) has focused on the 
information heterogeneity of underwriters, my study focuses on the information 
heterogeneity of institutional investors. My work contribute to the long-standing 
literature that examines that information environment of IPO market (Ritter &   
Welch 2002). 
 
Chapter 3. Institutional Background 
 
China opened its stock market around 1990 and set up two stock exchanges in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen, respectively. Since then, China’s IPO rules have 
experienced several reforms. From 1990-1999, fixed-price public offers were used 
with prices set by government according to a pre-determined formulas rather than   
by issuers (Jagannathan et al. 2010). Then a retail investor online auction was 
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instituted from July 1999 to June 2002. From July 2002 to 2004, a controlled P/E 
system was adopted in which offering price P/E ratios are required to be set at less 
than 20 (Ritter 2011). In 2005, the CSRC introduced a procedure officially referred 
to as “bookbuilding”, which was replaced by a new version in 2009 (Cheung et al. 
2009). This 2009 version “bookbuilding” method is in use until now. 
 
My study is based on the “bookbuiding” method adopted since 2009. In the 
“bookbuilding” procedure, shares to be issued are divided into two parts, an 
institutional tranche and a retail tranche. Institutional investors submit bid price and 
share demands in the institutional tranche. The underwriters collect bids from 
institutional tranche, analyze the demand and set the offer price. Retail investors 
subscribe to new shares through an online system, however they are not involved in 
the offer price setting procedure. 
 
The nature of the institutional tranche in China is a typical “sealed uniform dirty 
Dutch-auction”. During the period of bid submission, institutional investors are not 
allowed to know other investors’ bidding information. The offer price set by the 
underwriter can deviate from the market clearing price. Institutional investors that 
submit bids above the offer price are referred as winning investors and have the 
opportunity to get the shares at the uniform offer price6. Retail investors accept the 
offer price set afterwards and are not supposed to influence the behavior of 
institutional investors. 
 
Different from a typical bookbuilding process in US, in China’s version,  
underwriters are not able to use discretion in share allocation. Institutional    
investor’s share allocation in China is determined on pro rata and lottery basis and 
there is a difference between the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. In the Shanghai 
exchange, the number of shares that are allocated to a particular investor is based on 
the percentage of shares subscribed by this investor against total demand (number    
of shares subscribed by all winning institutional investors), which can be regarded   
as a pure pro rata basis. In the Shenzhen exchange, several institutional investors   
                                                       
6 The bookbuilding method in China requires a deposit from institutional investors. Institutional investors that 
are allocated the shares have to accept the shares and cannot withdraw. 
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are selected by lottery from the winning investors and then share allocation among 
these selected investors is based on pro rata. 
 
Institutional investors in the bookbuilding process include security firms, funds, 
trusts, insurance companies, SOE financial firms, and others. Institutional investors 
affiliated to the underwriter are not allowed to bid in China, which eliminates the 
favoritism as shown by Ritter & Zhang (2007). Nevertheless, in the Chinese IPO 
market, underwriters still have some pricing discretion. In this regard, investors still 
can be favored if underwriter intentionally discounts the offer price. This feature is 
similar to that of the “dirty” auction as used in U.S. where offer price can deviate 
from market clearing price. 
 
This IPO allocation method resembles a “hybrid” auction proposed by Jagannathan 
et al. (2010). Although the auction method is more transparent 7 , sophisticated 
investors have to anticipate the behavior of other investors, especially the behavior 
of irrational investors, which increases the cost of entry in the auction process.     
Since retail investors are allowed to participate only in the fixed price public offer 
tranche, the method limits auction participants to a relatively small, predictable 
number of institutional investors, who are supposed to be more sophisticated than 
retail investors. The effectiveness of this “hybrid” method has not been tested yet, 
and still remains as an open question. Features of IPO method in China in essence 
match all the requirements of “hybrid-auction” method, which provides a suitable 
setting to explore its effectiveness.  
 
A typical timeline of IPO bookbuilding process in China is presented in Table 1. The 
bookbuilding starts with an announcement (about day T-6) 8  by the issuer. The 
announcement releases the information of the IPO date and the number of shares 
issued in the institutional tranche and retail tranche respectively. In the subsequent 
days (T-5 to T-3), road shows are conducted in three cities: Beijing, Shanghai and 
Shenzhen. During road shows, the underwriter collects bids (including bid prices   
and share subscriptions) from institutional investors. Issuer and underwriter will 
                                                       
7 The spirit of the auction method is to give pricing power to the market. However, in the “dirty” auction of 
China, underwriters still can influence the pricing process. 
8 Following the terminology in China’s IPO market, day T is the day for subscription of retail investors. 
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analyze the demand and set the offer price on day T-2. On day T-1, an updated 
prospectus with an offer price is released. Then retail investors will submit the 
subscription application through the online system on date T. The share allocation for 
the institutional tranche is determined on T+1. On the following day (day T+2),        
the allocation result for institutional investors is released on T+2. On the same day, 
the share allocation for retail investors is determined by lottery. The allocation     
result for retail tranche is announced on day T+3. And on T+N the new shares   
become publicly traded. The average value of N is 10 in my sample. 
 
 [Insert Table 1] 
 
The bid information used in this study is obtained from the announcement on T+2. 
This bid information is required to be released by CSRC in order to increase the 
transparency of the bookbuilding process. I summarize the details of the related bid 
information as follows. 
 
(1) The account name for each institutional investor that subscribes to the IPO 
shares. 
(2) The specific bids and number of shares each institutional investor submits 
(3) The number of shares that are eventually allocated to the investor 
 
By using the information above along with other data, I construct several measures 
for analyzing the issue of performance persistence such as performance variables, 
market clearing prices and oversubscription rates. 
 
To summarize, the Chinese IPO market during my investigation period provides a 
unique setting for an investigation of performance persistence of institutional 
investors for at least three reasons. Firstly, bid information is required to be released, 
whereas such information is not available in other markets. Secondly, although the 
underwriters still have the discretion in setting the offer price, they cannot directly 
influence the performance of institutional investors via share allocation. This    
feature mitigates the concerns that the performance of institutional investors in     
IPOs may not reflect the superior ability or private information of these investors. 
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Lastly, the IPO mechanism used during my investigation period resembles the 
“hybrid”-method as proposed by prior studies as a promising IPO method. The  
setting of China allows me to examine the effectiveness of this proposed method. 
 
Chapter 4. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
 
4.1 Asymmetric information-based model and performance persistence 
 
In this subsection, I revisit one asymmetric information-based model, the adverse 
selection model of Rock (1986), and show how the information heterogeneity   
among investors will indicate the existence of a performance gap between informed 
and uninformed investors (that partially explains investors’ performance   
persistence). The following description is mainly based on the paper of Rock (1986) 
and the appendix of Beatty & Ritter (1986). 
 
In an IPO setting of the strict pro rata allocation rules 9 , Rock (1986) assume 
information heterogeneity exists among investors in the IPO subscription process. 
The true value of price per share, u, on offer is known to some investors who are 
informed by taking a cost c. Uninformed investors do not incur this cost and only 
know the probability density function of u, f(u). u will be realized as the aftermarket 
value on the initial listing day. The difference10 between u and the offer price (Offer) 
determines the change of the wealth for the subscribers. 
 
Underpriced IPOs (u> Offer) attract the participation of informed investors who   
have investable wealth of W-c. Informed investors’ behavior imposes a negative 
externality on uninformed investors. Uninformed investors will receive all the   
shares of overpriced IPOs (u< Offer), while their demand for underpriced IPOs is 
partly crowded out by the informed investors. This adverse selection problem 
impedes the participation of uninformed investors unless their expected profit is   
non-negative. According to Rock’s discussion, two equilibrium conditions are 
                                                       
9 The strict pro rata allocation rule means when the share is oversubscribed the allocation is based on the 
proportion of shares subscribed by the investors over the total demand. When the share allocation is 
discretionarily determined by underwriter, Rock’s model cannot be directly tested. 
10 Usually the difference is just initial return. 
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necessary for the success of the IPO market11.  
 
(a) Zero expected profits for informed investors 
ܰ ∙ ܿ ൌ α׬ ݊ሺݑ െ ܱ݂݂݁ݎሻ݂ሺݑሻ݀ݑାஶ௢௙௙௘௥ ,                                                            (1) 
where N is the number of informed investors. n is the number of shares. α 
denotes the percentage of shares allocated to the informed investors. c 
represents the cost imposed on informed investors for being informed. The 
right-hand side is the profit for informed investors. The aggregate cost of 
information acquisition is set to equal, the expected money “left on the table” 
(Beatty & Ritter 1986). 
(b) Zero expected profits for uninformed investors 
׬ ݊ሺܱ݂݂݁ݎ െ ݑሻ݂ሺݑሻ݀ݑ ൌ ሺ1 െ αሻ׬ ݊ሺݑ െ ܱ݂݂݁ݎሻ݂ሺݑሻ݀ݑାஶை௙௙௘௥
ை௙௙௘௥
଴ .         (2) 
For uninformed investors, they subscribe to the shares indiscriminately. The 
aggregate loss on overpriced issues (left-hand) equals the gross profit on 
underpriced issues (right-hand). This condition keeps the continued 
participation possible. 
 
In order to solve the optimal offer price in this context, α  needs to be given. 
According to the discussion by Beatty & Ritter (1986), α  is set to equal the  
proportion of aggregate informed investors’ demand to the total demand. The 
uninformed demand is assumed to be able to fully subscribe to the issue. That is 
 
ߙ ൌ ୅୥୥୰ୣ୥ୟ୲ୣ	୧୬୤୭୰୫ୣୢ	ୢୣ୫ୟ୬ୢ୅୥୥୰ୣ୥ୟ୲ୣ	୧୬୤୭୰୫ୣୢ	ୢୣ୫ୟ୬ୢା୅୥୥୰ୣ୥ୟ୲ୣ	୳୬୧୬୤୭୰୫ୣୢ	ୢୣ୫ୟ୬ୢ ൌ
ேሺௐି௖ሻ
ேሺௐି௖ሻାை௙௙௘௥∙௡.        (3) 
 
By assuming the probability density function, f(u), is uniform with parameter a and 
b (0൑a<b), the optimal offer price can be solved out using equations (1) and (2) as 
ܱ݂݂݁ݎ ൌ ܽ ൅ ሺ௕ି௔ሻ௖ௐି௖ ൅ ට
ଶ௔௖ሺ௕ି௔ሻ
ௐି௖ ൅
௖మሺ௕ି௔ሻమ
ሺௐି௖ሻమ .                                                          (4) 
The two equilibrium conditions yield an important implication. In the IPO setting 
with strict pro rata allocation rules, informed investors earn positive profits    
covering their costs of becoming informed, while uninformed earn zero profits. By 
                                                       
11 The success of the IPO market means the market will not collapse due to the adverse selection problem. 
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defining the performance of investors as the initial returns of shares subscribed, I 
obtain the expected aggregate profits of informed (PerfInfo) and uninformed 
investors (PerfUninfo) as 
ܲ݁ݎ݂ܫ݂݊݋ ൌ α׬ ݊ሺݑ െ ܱ݂݂݁ݎሻ݂ሺݑሻ݀ݑାஶை௙௙௘௥ ൌ ܰ ∙ ܿ,                                            (5) 
And 
ܲ݁ݎ݂ܷ݂݊݅݊݋ ൌ					 
׬ ݊ሺܱ݂݂݁ݎ െ ݑሻ݂ሺݑሻ݀ݑ െ ሺ1 െ αሻ ׬ ݊ሺݑ െ ܱ݂݂݁ݎሻ݂ሺݑሻ݀ݑାஶை௙௙௘௥
ை௙௙௘௥
଴ ൌ 0.  (6) 
Thus, the difference between expected aggregate profits of informed (ProfitInfo) and 
uninformed investors (ProfitUninfo) represents the gap in performance between      
the informed and uninformed. With the existence of informed investors (N is strictly 
positive), the gap in performance is positive. That is 
ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܫ݂݊݋ െ ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܷ݂݊݅݊݋ ൌ ܰ ∙ ܿ ൐ 0                                                            (7) 
 
4.2 Heterogeneity among informed investors 
 
Rock’s model assumes investors can be classified into two groups: the informed 
group and the uninformed group. However, the information of investors within the 
informed and uninformed groups is assumed to be homogeneous. I relax the 
assumption on within group investors in my study. Specifically, I assume that there 
exist information heterogeneity among the informed investors but the uninformed 
investors tend to be homogeneous. I believe that it is reasonable to assume that 
uninformed investors tend to be homogeneous. Given that they are uninformed they 
are unlikely to possess different information on the value of IPO stocks. On the     
other hand, the assumption behind information heterogeneity for informed investors 
is also reasonable for the following two reasons. 
 
(1) Heterogeneous ability in knowing the true value 
In Rock’s model, all the informed investors know the true value of new shares. 
Therefore, informed investors are homogeneous and only target attractively 
underpriced shares. However, in the real world, the precision in knowing the    
true value can be heterogeneous for different informed investors. This 
heterogeneous precision may be caused by different abilities among informed 
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investors (either innate intelligence or human capital acquired through    
education and experience). This is the same explanation for the performance 
persistence in the secondary market (Elton et al. 1993). 
(2) Heterogeneous resource available for conducting research 
Institutional investors may have a constrained budget for conducting research     
on new shares. The heterogeneous performance persistence within the informed 
investor group is possible if we assume that different investor group can afford  
to conduct research only on a limited number of IPOs. For example, some 
investors can afford to investigate all IPOs and therefore cherry-pick the best, 
whereas some can investigate only a few IPOs at the same time. In this regard, 
investors with tight budget constraints for conducting research will   
underperform ones with loose budget constraints. 
 
The above two reasons are not mutually exclusive. As I shall explain shortly under 
hypothesis development, my assumptions on within group investors implies that 
performance persistence is unlikely to be observed among uninformed investors 
while it can be expected for informed investors. 
 
4.3 Hypothesis Development 
 
Based on the theoretical background and extant literature above, I propose the main 
hypotheses for empirical testing. There are two sets of hypotheses in my study. The 
first set focuses on the testing of the existence of performance persistence of 
institutional investors, while the second set aims to trace the reasons underlying the 
performance persistence that I have documented. 
 
Following prior studies that investigate the performance persistence in the    
secondary market (Grinblatt & Titman 1992), I use a two-period analysis to develop 
my first hypothesis: If investor persistence exists, then average performance in the 
first period will be positively correlated to that in the second period. 
 
H1a Investors’ performance in the first period will be positively correlated with that 
in the second period. 
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This hypothesis will be tested at both the investor-level and bid-level. At the level    
of investors, the average performance of institutional investors in the second period 
is regressed on their corresponding average performance in the first period. In the 
bid-level analysis, the average performance of an institutional investor in the first 
period is used to predict the performance for each subscription in the second       
period.. 
 
H1a suggests that institutional investors with good past performance are relatively 
more informed than those with bad past performance. Under my assumption that 
uninformed investors tend to be homogeneous but informed investors tend to be 
heterogeneous. I further expect to observe the existence of significant performance 
persistence in the subsample of investors with good past performance but not with 
bad past performance. This is predicted as the belief that uninformed investors will 
subscribe to shares randomly and we are unlikely to observe differences in 
performance among these investors. Among the informed investors, the relatively 
more informed investors are able to pick up better IPO stocks than the less      
informed ones. This can lead to the occurrence of performance gap among the 
informed investors. So I develop the following hypothesis. 
 
H1b For investors with good past performance, investors’ performance in the first 
period will be positively correlated with that in the second period, whereas for 
investors with bad past performance, performance persistence cannot be observed. 
 
Similar to H1a, H1b12 will also be tested at both the investor-level and bid-level. 
 
Hoberg (2007) shows that the average past performance of an underwriter is 
informative of the underwriter’s current IPO performance. As an analogy of Hoberg 
(2007), the past performance of an institutional investor should reveal the quality of 
institutional investors. Thus, the aggregate level of the past performance of the 
                                                       
12 Note that this hypothesis H1b does not imply that the performance persistence of institutional investors is 
driven by investors with good past performance. The existence of performance gap between two informed and 
uninformed investors leads to the performance persistence in the full sample. The subsample analysis is built 
on the theoretical discussions that informed investors can also be heterogeneous. 
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institutional investors who have participated in an IPO should be informative to the 
IPO’s initial and subsequent returns at the issue-level. Specifically, the participation 
of more investors who have good past performance suggests that this new IPO is 
more likely to be underpriced. Thus, I develop the following hypothesis. 
 
H1c The initial return of new issues will be positively correlated with the 
participating institutional investors’ average past performance. 
 
To test this hypothesis, I construct an issue-level index to capture the past 
performance of all subscribers in an IPO. In addition to the initial returns as    
specified in H1c, I also examine whether the past performance of subscribers is 
relevant to the three-month returns. 
 
My second set of hypotheses aims at testing whether the performance persistence I 
observed is caused by the information heterogeneity of investors. My hypotheses 
mainly build on the prior research that focuses on information heterogeneity of 
investors in the IPO market. Specifically, I examine whether investors with good   
past performance are more likely to participate in issues with high underpricing 
(Sherman 2005), exhibit stronger bid shaving ability (Chiang et al. 2010), provide 
more accurate information in terms of a high elasticity of demand curve (Kandel et 
al. 1999; Liu et al. 2001), and show a weaker tendency of naïve reinforcement 
learning (Degeorge et al. 2010; Chiang et al. 2011). 
 
Firstly, according to both the adverse selection model Rock (1986) and information 
production model (Sherman & Titman 2002; Sherman 2005), investors choose to 
participate in an IPO endogenously and informed investors tend to participate only 
in IPOs with underpricing. As a result, existing studies take the positive relationship 
between endogenous entry of certain investors and underpricing as the evidence     
that these investors are informed (Chiang et al. 2010). In my setting, if institutional 
investors with good past performance are more likely to be informed, the entry of 
these investors is expected to be positively correlated with initial return of the IPOs 
they participate in. My specific hypothesis is: 
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H2a Institutional investors with good past performance are likely to earn positive 
returns in the future IPOs they participate in. 
 
To test this hypothesis, I use the oversubscription rates of the investors with good 
past performance and bad past performance as the proxies for their respective 
endogenous entries. The effects of endogenous entry of both types of investors on 
three-month returns are also expected to be positive and therefore examined in my 
empirical analysis. 
 
Secondly, the bookbuilding exercise in China resembles a uniform auction. 
Subscribers have to anticipate the bidding behavior of others. As Sherman (2005) 
points out, informed investors are capable of submitting the bids high enough to 
insure the opportunity to obtain a prorate allocation of shares (shaving the bid 
adequately) when the shares are expected to be underpriced13. For example, in an 
underpriced issue, informed investors will submit high bids (shave the bids 
adequately) to ensure their bids are not less than the offer price. Therefore, the 
positive relationship between average level of bids submitted by certain investors  
and underpricing can be treated as the evidence that these investors are informed. 
“Bid premium”, calculated as the weighted average of bids, has been used by the 
existing studies on auction-based settings such as mergers and acquisitions   
(Kummer & Hoffmeister 1978) and auctioned IPOs (Chiang et al. 2010) to measure 
the behavior of bidders. Following these studies, I use the bid premium to quantify 
the level of bids submitted by subscribers and develop the following hypothesis. 
 
H2b The bid premium of institutional investors with good past performance is 
positively correlated with the initial return of the current IPO. 
 
Previous literature argues that the demand curve with a high elasticity is indicative 
of high information content in investors’ bids, because if investors have access to 
more precise valuation information, their bids are closer to each other resulting an 
elastic demand curve (Kandel et al. 1999; Cornelli & Goldreich 2003). Therefore, if 
                                                       
13 Chiang et al. (2010) refers this point in the context of IPO auction as partial adjustment similar to that for 
bookbuilt IPOs in (Hanley 1993). 
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institutional investors with good past performance are really informed, the 
participation of more investors with good past performance should be associated  
with a more elastic demand curve. I thus formulate the following two hypotheses. 
 
H2c The average past performance of all participating institutional investors in the 
current issue is positively correlated with the elasticity of the demand curve. 
 
H2d Endogenous entry of institutional investors with good past performance is 
positively correlated with the elasticity of the demand curve. 
 
Another dimension I explore is the different levels of behavioral bias among  
investors with different levels of past performance. Starting from Kaustia &    
Knüpfer (2008), researchers are concerned about whether investors overweight their 
past experience in their subscription of IPO shares. Some studies also show that   
good past performance in terms of financial decisions encourages investors to make 
similar decisions in the future (Choi et al. 2009; Seru et al. 2010). The dependence 
of current decisions on past performance has been considered as evidence of   
learning by economic actors. Nevertheless, learning can be rational or naïve and 
differentiating between these two types of learning is empirically challenging.  
Chiang et al. (2011) examine whether the performance of investors decreases as    
they participate in more IPOs. The pattern of deteriorating performance is taken as 
evidence of naïve reinforcement learning. Building on this approach, Chiang et al. 
(2011) find that retail investors are driven by naïve reinforcement learning, whereas 
institutional investors do not show such a tendency. In my study, if the investors    
with good past performance are relatively more informed, they will less likely to 
display the pattern of naïve reinforcement learning, while ones with bad past 
performance is more prone to this behavioral bias (perform even worse in the     
future). As a result, I develop the following hypothesis. 
 
H2e Investors with good performance in the first period show less tendency of naïve 
reinforcement learning. 
 
Chapter 5. Empirical evidence 
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This chapter presents the major results in my study. Section 5.1 describes the data 
sources. Section 5.2 discusses the definitions of key variables and summary    
statistics. Section 5.3 presents the evidence of the performance persistence of 
institutional investors. Section 5.4 conducts further analysis to explore the 
information heterogeneity among institutional investors.  
 
5.1 Data 
 
To increase transparency in China’s primary market, all IPO issues are required to 
release detailed bidding and participation information since Nov 2010. This study 
uses the full bidding information for the IPO issues in both the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen exchanges from Nov 2010 to Oct 2012. The sample has a total of 477 
bookbuilt IPOs starting from the first IPO with full information release. The sample 
starts from the first IPO that is required by CSRC to release the complete bid 
information and ends in Oct 2012 when a 13-month IPO moratorium was 
implemented by CSRC in Nov 2012. Therefore, my sample period is the longest 
possible sample period with complete bid information being available. 
 
In this study, bidding information and IPO filing price ranges are hand-collected from 
firm announcement files. Other information on IPO characteristics, such as 
underwriters, is obtained from the WIND information system. The trading data are 
collected from the CSMAR database. 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
Figure 1 shows the number of IPOs and average initial returns by calendar month 
over the sample period in this study, Nov 2010 to Oct 2012. The dashed line shows 
the average initial return is 24% for the full sample in the study period. The 
Histograms and the solid line show the number of issues and the average initial 
returns by month, respectively. We see that the number of IPOs per month is  
relatively stable however the monthly average IPO initial returns are volatile. The 
fluctuation of IPO initial returns across months indicates the uncertainty of    
investing in IPO market.  
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5.2 Variables 
 
Following most of the IPO literature, the initial return (ܫܴ) is defined as 
 
ܫܴ ≡ ௖௟௢௦௘ି௢௙௙௘௥௢௙௙௘௥ , 
 
where ݈ܿ݋ݏ݁ is the closing price at the first trading day and ݋݂݂݁ݎ is the offer price 
for an IPO. In the bookbuilding process of China, institutional investors that       
submit a bid price of no less than the offer price have the opportunity to obtain a 
prorate allocation of shares. Such investors are referred as winning investors in my 
study. The winning dummy for the participation of each institutional investor is 
defined as 
 
Win௜௧ ≡ ൜1, ܾ݅݀௜௧ ൒ ݋݂݂݁ݎ0, ܾ݅݀௜௧ ൏ ݋݂݂݁ݎ, 
 
where ܾ݅݀௜௧ is the bid price submitted by investor ݅ at issue ݐ . As only winning 
investors have the opportunity to benefit from high underpricing, I define the 
performance for each investor in an IPO as the initial return if the investor’s bid is  
no less than the offer price and zero otherwise. The specific definition is as follows: 
 
Perf௜௧ ≡ ൜ܫܴ, ܾ݅݀௜௧ ൒ ݋݂݂݁ݎ0, ܾ݅݀௜௧ ൏ ݋݂݂݁ݎ, 
 
where Perf௜௧  is the performance for investor ݅  that submits a bid price ܾ݅݀௜௧  for    
issue ݐ . The performance definition is similar to the definition of returns in    
Degeorge et al. (2010). I apply this definition for several reasons: Firstly, 
underpricing is a natural component of performance. Investors that participate in     
the issues with high underpricing obtain a proportionate share of the money left on 
the table. When the shares are overpriced, investors make a loss through the 
subscription. Secondly, submitting bids no less than offer price is the necessary 
condition to gain the underpricing under the Chinese setting. As the actual     
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allocation of IPO shares under the lottery system in the Shenzhen exchange     
involves the element of luck (which is unrelated to investors’ stock picking     
abilities), measuring performance on the basis of the necessary condition for    
entering into a lottery rather than actual allocation of shares can help to remove the 
confounding influences of luck in my performance measure. 
 
IPO underpricing is not stationary (Ritter & Welch 2002). Market condition can 
impact the level of underpricing and the performance of investors. To mitigate the 
effect of market condition, I conduct a two-period analysis, which follows the  
method to test the performance persistence in the secondary market (Grinblatt & 
Titman 1992). The sample is divided into two periods with roughly the same  
numbers of issues in each period. The average performance of investors in two 
periods is defined respectively as follows. 
 
Perf1௜ ≡ ଵ୒೔భ ∑ Perf௜௧
୒೔భ௧ୀଵ , and Perf2௜ ≡ ଵ୒೔మ ∑ Perf௜௧
୒೔మ௧ୀଵ , 
 
where N௜ଵ  and N௜ଶ  are the number of participations of investor ݅  in the first and  
second period respectively. The performance persistence requires that Perf1 have a 
significant explanatory power on Perf2 in investor-level analysis. 
 
As discussed in the hypotheses development, performance persistence implies that 
past performance of all subscribers will have a positive effect on the initial and 
subsequent returns of the current issue. For each IPO, the weighted average14 of     
past performance of subscribers is measured by a constructed variable, PastPerf௧. 
 
PastPerf௧ ≡ ଵ௄೟෍ Perf1௜ ∙
஻௜ௗ௦௜௭௘೔೟
்௢௧௔௟	ௗ௘௠௔௡ௗ೟
௄೟
௜ୀଵ
, 
 
where ܭ௧  is the number of institutional investors that participate in issue ݐ .   
ܤ݅݀ݏ݅ݖ݁௜௧  is the amount of shares subscribed by investor ݅  in issue ݐ .  
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	݀݁݉ܽ݊݀௧ denotes the total demand from all institutional investors in issue ݐ. 
                                                       
14 Using simple average does not influence the main result. 
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஻௜ௗ௦௜௭௘೔೟
்௢௧௔௟	ௗ௘௠௔௡ௗ೟ is the proportion of shares that are expected to be allocated to the 
institutional investor ݅ . If performance persistence exists, PastPerf௧  should be 
informative for the underpricing and subsequent returns. The rationale for this 
variable is consistent with Bouwman (2011) who constructs a firm-level variable to 
measure the effect of a current director who also serves on the boards of other        
firms. 
 
Furthermore, I define two variables to measure the IPO subsequent returns as   
follows. The adjusted initial return (Adj_IR) is defined as the initial return (IR) less 
the market return (M_Ret) as 
 
Adj_IR ≡ IR െ M_Ret, 
 
My study applies the CSI 300 return as the market benchmark. In addition, to  
measure the subsequent returns, I define the buy-and-hold abnormal return as  
follows. 
 
BHAR௧ ≡ ∏ ሺ1 ൅ Ret௧௞ሻ௞ଵ െ ∏ ሺ1 ൅M_Ret௧௞ሻ௞ଵ , 
 
Where Ret௧௞ is the stock return for issue ݐ at ݇ -th trading day in the aftermarket. 
Thus BHAR௧ is the ݇ -day buy-and-hold abnormal return for issue ݐ . In my study,         
I examine BHAR௧  over different periods. BHAR10d, BHAR3m, BHAR6m and 
BHAR1y represent buy-and-hold abnormal returns of ten days, three months, six 
months and one year respectively. 
 
Following the literature, I include other firm-specific characteristics as control 
variables as follows. 
 
 Mkt15: The 15 day average market return before the issue day (Logue 1973) 
 PriorIR30: Average initial returns of the IPO issued within 30 days before the 
current issue (Ibbotson & Jaffe 1975) 
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 Overhang: Shares retained by the entrepreneur divided by shares filed 15 
(Bradley & Jordan 2002) 
 UwCap: Natural logarithm of capital raised by the lead underwriter in the 
previous calendar year (Megginson & Weiss 1991) 
 PriceRev: IPO offer price relative to midpoint of filing range (Lowry &   
Schwert 2002) 
 InvPrice: A proxy for issuer risk, equal to the reciprocal of the filing midpoint 
(Tinic 1988)16 
 Age: Years since the establishment of the firm 
 Amount: Natural logarithm of the original filing amount for the issue 
 Size: Natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets in the preceding year 
 ROA: Net income in preceding year divided by total asset 
 Lev: The total debt divided by total assets 
 SOE: A dummy equal to one if the firm is state-owned enterprise based on the 
ultimate controller 
 
PriorIR30 and Mkt15 are adopted as the proxies to control for the effect of market 
condition. Overhang is for the overhang problem for entrepreneurs. UwCap 
represents the quality of underwriters. PriceRev is a proxy for partial adjustment. 
InvPrice, Amount, Age and Size are typical proxies for new share risk. ROA and    
Lev control for IPO firms’ financial conditions. 
 
In October 2009, ChiNext, a NASDAQ-like market was opened in the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange for young growth companies. IPOs on this market are not required 
to have positive earnings in each of the three years prior to going public. To control 
for related risks of these growth enterprises’ IPOs, I use a dummy, ChiNext, which  
is coded one if the IPO is listed in ChiNext market and zero otherwise. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
The summary statistics of main variables are presented in Table 2. Panel A shows  
                                                       
15 The number of shares filed means the number of shares sold in the IPO.  
16 The filing midpoint proxies for the ex‐ante uncertainty of the IPOs, as low‐priced stocks tend to be issued by 
highly speculative firms. 
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477 IPOs have an average initial return of 24% with a standard deviation 33%. 
Furthermore, I categorize the IPO companies by CSRC industry classifications. 71% 
of the IPOs in the sample period are in the manufacturing industry. IPOs in the 
industries of mining and communication have the highest average initial returns  
(42%) in the sample. 
 
In order to conduct the two-period analysis, the full sample is divided into two parts 
with 239 IPOs in the first period and 238 IPOs in the second period respectively.    
The average return in the first period is the same as the second period; however the 
return volatility is slightly greater in the first period. 
 
The descriptive statistics for issue-level variables are reported in Panel B of Table 2. 
All the analysis is conducted in the second period (testing period). The sample in     
the second period consists of 238 IPOs. PastPerf, constructed as the bid-size  
weighted average of past performance for all the institutional investors in the     
current issue, has a mean of 0.16 and standard deviation of 0.02. Mkt15, the      
average market return (CSI 300) for the 15-trading days preceding the issue date,   
has very low mean and standard deviation. PriorIR30, the average initial return of 
IPOs issued in the 30 days before the issue date, has the mean of 0.26. The variable 
of Overhang suggests that on average 77% of the shares are retained by the original 
shareholders. The mean of PriceRev indicates that on average the offer price is 12% 
lower than the midpoint of the filing range. And 44% of the IPOs are in the ChiNext 
market. 
 
Panel C shows the performance measures at the investor-level and at the bid-level. 
There are total of 648 institutional investors that have participated in both periods. I 
divide the 648 investors into two subsamples with an equal number of investors    
(324 each) based on the performance in the first period, i.e., “good” group and “bad” 
group respectively. The average performance for these total sample investors is 0.17. 
For investors with good past performance, the average performance in the second 
period is 0.19, which is 0.04 greater than the investors with bad past performance. 
The spread is significant at 1% level. The bid-level sample consists of 36591 bids in 
the full period with 19541 and 17050 in the first and second period, respectively.    
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The performance in the second period for the investors with good past performance 
is 0.02 greater than the investors with bad past performance, and the performance 
difference is also significant at 1% level. 
 
The investors in my study consist of five types, security companies, mutual funds, 
trust/insurance, SOE financial firms, and other investors that are recommended by 
the underwriter to be included in the bidding process17. Among all these investors, 
funds are the majority (55.4%) and have the best performance in both periods with 
0.19 and 0.21, respectively. There are on average 76.71 bids per issue and 18.36%   
of them eventually get share allocations. The detailed information is presented in 
Panel D of Table 2. 
 
5.3 Performance persistence 
 
This section presents the major empirical evidence on performance persistence of 
institutional investors in the IPO market. My analysis in this section consists of     
three parts. In the first part, I conduct cross-sectional regression using the         
investor-level sample, where the average performance in the second period for each 
investor is regressed on that in the first period. The ordinary least square regression 
model is specified as follows: 
 
Perf2௜ ൌ α ൅ βଵPerf1௜ ൅ ܶݕ݌݁௜ ൅ ߝ௜, 
 
where Perf1 and Perf2 are performance in the first and second period. ܶݕ݌݁௜ is 
dummy for investor types. ߝ௜  is the residual. In the analysis                 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980) are used to calculate           
t-statistics. 
 
In order to offer evidence on H1b, this model is also estimated using subsamples of 
institutional investors with good past performance and bad past performance. The 
“good” group refers to the institutional investors with good past (first-period) 
                                                       
17 According to the regulations by CSRC, some institutional investors that do not meet the requirements to 
participate in the primary market can get access to the share subscription if they are “recommended” by the 
underwriter. 
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performance, whereas the “bad” group refers to institutional investors with bad   
(first-period) past performance. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 3. For 
the full sample and the “good” group, past performance Perf1 is significant across  
all model specifications, whereas performance persistence cannot be observed in     
the “bad” group. Specifically, Models (1) and (2) show that the average     
performance in the first period is positively and significantly correlated to the  
average performance in the second period. For investors with good past    
performance (Models (3) and (4)), this effect is still significant at least at 10% level. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
As shown by the prior research that examines the issue of performance persistence 
in secondary market, solid evidence of performance persistence has to address the 
survivorship problem (Brown & Goetzmann 1995). It is possible that investors with 
good past performance tend to be more likely to remain in the sample, whereas ones 
with bad past performance drop out. This survivorship bias can be partially    
corrected by using the Heckman model (Heckman 1979). Carhart et al. (2002) 
employ this approach in their analysis of mutual fund persistence. In their sample, 
1346 funds survive out of 2071 funds in the full sample. In my study, a two-stage 
Heckman model is also conducted to mitigate the potential survivorship bias in IPO 
market. The Heckman two-stage model is as follows. 
 
1st	stage:	Part௜ ൌ θ ൅ γଵPerf1௜ ൅ γଶWin1௜ ൅ γଷAlloc௜ ൅ ܶݕ݌݁௜ ൅ ߳௜. 
2nd	stage:	Perf2௜ ൌ α ൅ βଵPerf1௜ ൅ ߣ௜ ൅ ܶݕ݌݁௜ ൅ ߝ௜. 
 
In the first stage of the Heckman model, Probit estimation is applied to predict the 
participation of investors in the second period, measured by a dummy Part.  
According to Kaustia & Knüpfer (2008), past performance is a determinant for the 
current subscription decision. In addition, due to the possibility of limited capital 
caused by share allocation in the first period, the allocation probability is expected  
to be negatively correlated to the participation in the second period. The types of 
institutional investors are considered to control for the investor-specific 
characteristics that may influence the participation behavior. Therefore, past 
performance (Perf1), past winning probability (Win1), past allocation probability 
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(Alloc) and investor types (Type) are included in the selection equation (1st stage). 
The predicted dummy variable Part is retrieved and used to calculate the inverse  
Mills ratio, ߣ௜, which is included in the second stage equation. The result using the 
Heckman model is presented in Panel B of Table 3. The first stage of Heckman   
model suggests that performance in the first period does not have a significant   
impact on the participation decision in the second period. In contrast, allocation 
probability significantly decreases the propensity of entry in the second period 
because of the capital budget constrain for institutional investors. Other results in    
the Heckman model are similar to the OLS estimation. To sum up, the                
investor-level analysis provides robust evidence that is consistent with H1a and    
H1b. 
 
In the second part, a bid-level panel regression analysis is applied. Average 
performance in the first period, Perf1, is employed to predict the performance of 
participation for each investor in the second period measured by Perf. The model is 
as follows. 
 
Perf௜௧ ൌ α ൅ βଵPerf1௜ ൅ ܺ௧ ൅ ܶݕ݌݁௜ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ൅ ܻ݁ܽݎ ൅ ߝ௜௧, 
 
where ܺ௧  are a series of control variables discussed in last section. ܶݕ݌݁௜  are  
investor type dummies. ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ  and ܻ݁ܽݎ  are industry and year dummies, 
respectively. ߝ௜௧ is the residual. The result is presented in Table 4. The bid-level 
sample consists of 17050 bids in the second period for all investors, 8489 bids for 
investors with good past performance and 8561 bids for ones with bad past 
performance. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
The coefficients of past performance in the first period (Perf1) positively and 
significantly explain the performance of current participation (Perf) across different 
model specifications in the full sample and the “good” group subsample. The 
explanatory power of Perf1 on the performance in the second period is robust to 
standard controls, investor types, industry and year dummies. In contrast, investors 
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with bad past performance do not exhibit the pattern of performance persistence.    
The panel regressions at the bid-level use standard errors clustered on both investor 
and calendar month (Petersen 2009). The evidence of bid-level analysis is    
supportive to H1a and H1b. 
 
The third part is an issue-level analysis on IPO initial and subsequent returns. 
According to H1c, the initial returns on the current issue are expected to be   
positively correlated with average past performance of investors. I use the     
following model to test this hypothesis. 
 
IR௧ ൌ α ൅ βଵPastPerf௧ ൅ ܺ௧ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ൅ ܻ݁ܽݎ ൅ ߝ௧, 
 
where PastPerf is the bid-size weighted average of past performance for current 
subscribers. ܺ௧ represent a series of existing predictors for initial returns. Industry 
and year dummies are also included to control for the industry and year specific 
characteristics. The results are reported in Table 5. 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
The issue-level sample consists of 238 IPOs in the second period. The measure of 
past performance, PastPerf, positively and significantly affects initial returns (IR) 
with t-statistic of 2.81 and adjusted initial returns (Adj-IR) with t-statistic of 2.76 
when all the controls are included. The signs on the coefficients of control variables 
are generally consistent with the existing literature except PriceRev and UwCap. 
According to the extant literature on partial adjustment, PriceRev should be positive 
(Hanley 1993). However, in China this effect cannot be observed, probably due to 
the fact that the limited discretion of underwriter in share allocation mitigates the 
possibility for underwriters to benefit from competitions for new share and side 
payments. UwCap, which controls for the effect of underwriter reputation, has a 
positive coefficient in the literature (Megginson & Weiss 1991), but it does not have 
a significant effect in my sample. Tian (2011) finds a positive correlation between 
state-ownership and underpricing over the period of 1992 to 2004. However, in my 
sample period (2010 to 2012), the effect of SOE is not significant. 
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In addition to the tests for initial returns, I also conduct an analysis on the effect of 
past performance on subsequent returns (BHAR). The results suggest that the 
explanatory power of PastPerf still remains intact for the short term (ten-day and 
three-month) buy-and-hold abnormal returns, but the effect of PastPerf diminishes 
over time. PastPerf is insignificant on the six-month and one-year buy-and-hold 
abnormal return analyses when all the controls are included. I also check the result 
on two-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns with available data. An untabulated   
table shows that the effect is also insignificant as I expected. Because my main 
dependent variables of interest are initial and intermediate returns, the evidence in 
general is consistent with H1c. 
 
. 
 
5.4 Information heterogeneity among institutional investors 
 
This section provides the evidence that investors with good past performance are 
relatively more informed than ones with bad past performance. The results 
corroborate the information heterogeneity among institutional investors and show 
that the pattern of performance persistence of institutional investors is consistent  
with the prevailing evidence on asymmetric information based models. The results 
of tests for the second set of my hypotheses are presented in Table 6. 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
Firstly, as discussed above, endogenous entry of investors in the “good” group is 
expected to be positively correlated with the initial returns. The oversubscription   
rate indicates the demand for certain investors and therefore serves as a reasonable 
proxy for endogenous entry of these investors. The measures are calculated for 
investors in the “good” and “bad” groups as Entry_G and Entry_B, respectively. To 
compare the bid shaving ability between investors in good and bad groups, I follow 
Chiang et al. (2010) to construct the bid premiums for these two groups of investors 
as follows. 
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Bidpremium_G௧ ൌ෍ ୠ୧ୢ೔೟ோ௔௡௚௘_௠௜ௗ೟ ∙
௄
ଵ
ୠ୧ୢୱ୧୸ୣ೔೟
୲୭୲ୟ୪	ୢୣ୫ୟ୬ୢ೟,  
and  
Bidpremium_B௧ ൌ෍ ୠ୧ୢ೔೟ோ௔௡௚௘_௠௜ௗ೟ ∙
௏
ଵ
ୠ୧ୢୱ୧୸ୣ೔೟
୲୭୲ୟ୪	ୢୣ୫ୟ୬ୢ೟, 
 
where K and V denote the number of institutional investors in the “good” group and 
the “bad” group. ܴܽ݊݃݁_݉݅݀௧ is the midpoint of the filing range of the current     
issue. Bidpremium_G  and Bidpremium_B  are the bid premiums for investors in    
the “good” group and “bad” group, respectively. The results are reported in Panel A 
of Table 6. In this issue-level analysis, endogenous entry of investors in the “good” 
group has a significant effect on initial and subsequent returns, whereas that of 
investors with bad past performance is not significant. Similarly, bid premium for 
investors with good past performance is significant, while bid premium for those  
with bad past performance is not significant. The results are robust when all the 
controls and dummies are included. The effect also exists on the three-month          
buy-and-hold returns. Taken together, the results are consistent with H2a and H2b. 
 
Another indicative measure of information is the elasticity of the demand curve. I 
define the elasticity as the relative change of bid price to that of the bid size, which 
is comparable to the approach used by Kandel et al. (1999). The average past 
performance and endogenous entry of investors with good past performance are 
expected to be positively correlated with the elasticity of the demand curve. Panel B 
of Table 6 displays the results. Across all model specifications, the average past 
performance of current subscribers has a significant effect on the elasticity of the 
demand curve. Endogenous entry of investors in the “good” group is positively 
correlated with the elasticity of the demand curve, whereas entry of investors in the 
“bad” group has a negative effect. The results suggest that participation of the 
investors with good past performance increases the accuracy of information in     
terms of the elasticity of the demand curve. H2c and H2d are therefore supported. 
 
The influence of behavioral bias is further explored among investors with different 
past performance. Theories of reinforcement learning suggest that the current 
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behavior of investors is expressed as a function of past experience. If investors are 
biased by naive reinforcement learning, then the performance should be a    
decreasing function of participation order. That is, investors learn nothing from     
their past experience. Panel C of Table 6 presents the result of the OLS regression 
predicting performance using participation order. Models (1) and (2) show that on 
average the participation order is negatively correlated with performance. The result 
indicates that in general more participation experience leads to lower performance. 
However, in the subsample analysis, only investors in the “bad” group display this 
pattern of naïve reinforcement learning, while investors in the “good” group do not. 
This evidence suggests that institutional investors with good past performance are 
less subjective to naïve reinforcement learning and therefore provides supportive 
evidence for H2e. 
 
Chapter 6. Additional analysis 
 
This chapter presents some additional analyses. Section 6.1 analyzes whether the 
observed performance persistence of institutional investors is due to the influences 
of underwriters. Section 6.2 investigates whether the performance persistence is 
caused by investor sentiment effects triggered by the release of bidding information. 
Section 6.3 conducts tests to rule out the possibility that the performance     
persistence is caused by investors who consistently submit high bids and low bids. 
Section 6.4 further tests the effect of industry-specific expertise. Section 6.5    
presents a robustness check. 
 
6.1 The influence of underwriters 
 
Although underwriters in China enjoy no discretion in share allocation, they 
nevertheless still have pricing discretion 18 . The existence of pricing discretion 
implies that certain investors can enjoy superior performance by underwriters if the 
underwriters intentionally discount the shares to favor them (Hauser et al. 2006).  
This favoritism from underwriters could generate the pattern of investors’ 
performance persistence as I have documented. On the other hand, some investors 
                                                       
18 On average, the offer price is 14% lower than the market clearing price. The Pearson correlation between 
the market clearing price and the offer price is 0.986, which suggests the demand of institutional investors is 
still the major consideration in the price setting strategy. 
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can consistently achieve better performance if they have higher ability to correctly 
anticipate the big discounts offered by underwriters. I therefore conduct additional 
analyses to mitigate this potential concern. 
 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
I construct two variables to capture the possible favoritism from underwriters.    
Firstly, I follow Degeorge et al. (2010)  to use the variable of price discount to   
measure underwriter’s pricing discretion. The discount is defined as 
 
Discount௧ ≡ ெ஼௉೟ି௢௙௙௘௥೟ெ஼௉೟ , 
 
where ܯܥ ௧ܲ is the market clearing price, the minimum price that allows the total 
demand for the new shares in the market to meet the filing amount. ݋݂݂݁ݎ is the   
offer price. 
 
Secondly, I construct a variable to measure the extent of underwriter-investor 
connection. Connect_N is the number of participations in the first period that 
involves the same pair of underwriter and investor. 
 
I first conduct a bid-level analysis to regress the price discount of an IPO on the      
past performance of each subscriber. The results are reported in Models (1) and (2) 
of Table 7. When I include the control variables and all the fixed effects, Perf1 has 
positive effect on Discount. The results suggest that the participation of investors 
with good past performance tend to be associated with a deeper discount. This      
result can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it may indicate institutional 
investors with good past performance are capable of anticipating underwriters’ 
pricing strategies. On the other hand, it may be caused by underwriters’ favoritism 
towards some specific investors. 
 
My key concern is whether the performance persistence is driven by favoritism     
from underwriters. I therefore include the variable of Discount or Connect-N 
alternatively into my previous regression models. The results are reported in Table 7. 
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As the coefficients on Perf1 are still positively significant, the results suggest that   
the performance persistence observed at the bid-level is unlikely to be driven by 
underwriters’ favoritism. 
 
I also conduct additional issue-level analysis to further rule out that the predictive 
power of my investor-based index is driven by underwriters’ favoritism. To do this,  
I construct an issue-level variable for capturing the extent of underwriter-investor 
connection. The issue-level variable, Ave_Connect_N, equals the average of 
Connect_N for all subscribers in an IPO. The result is reported in Panel B of Table  
7. The first two columns show the existence of a positive relation between the   
average past performance of current subscribers and Discount, which indicates the 
possible existence of underwriters’ favoritism. Nevertheless, the last four columns   
of the Table show that my investor-based index still retains its predictive power     
after Discount and Ave_Connect_N are included. Thus, my results are not driven by 
underwriters’ favoritisms. 
 
6.2 Investors’ attention 
 
Ljungqvist et al. (2006) and Ritter & Welch (2002) suggest that the investor  
sentiment effect may be built up surrounding an IPO, which can drive up the IPO’s 
initial return. It is possible that the release of bidding information in China may  
attract attention from investors and consequently causes high initial returns. Seen in 
this light, the high initial returns earned by certain institutional investors are not due 
to their information or stock picking ability but the investor sentiment effects. To 
control for this possibility, I construct an abnormal search volume index (ASVI) as 
in Da et al. (2011). This search-based variable measures the changes in                
market-wide attention in a timely fashion using the technology of “Google Trend”. 
As Google was banned on March 2010 in China, I therefore use Baidu, the biggest 
search engine in China19, to quantify the search volume of investors in my study. 
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
                                                       
19 According to iResearch, a Chinese consulting firm, Baidu controlled 63% of Internet search revenue in China 
(Barboza 2010). 
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Figure 2 presents the average search volume index (SVI calculated by natural 
logarithm) around the release day of the bidding information (day zero is the day on 
which information is released). Because the media coverage from the road shows  
and the raw prospectus before the release day has captured investors’ attention 
significantly, SVI shows a general decline during the whole ten-day period. 
Nevertheless, a very slight bump can still be observed on day one after the 
information has been released. I define abnormal search volume index (ASVI)     
using two windows as follows. 
 
ܣܸܵܫሺ5ሻ ≡ ଵହ∑ logሺܸܵܫ௧ሻସ௧ୀ଴ െ
ଵ
ହ∑ logሺܸܵܫ௧ሻିଵ௧ୀିହ , 
and 
ܣܸܵܫሺ2ሻ ≡ ଵଶ∑ log	ሺܸܵܫ௧ሻଵ௧ୀ଴ െ
ଵ
ଶ∑ log	ሺܸܵܫ௧ሻିଵ௧ୀିଶ , 
 
where ܸܵܫ௧  is the average search volume index on day ݐ . ܣܸܵܫሺ5ሻ  denotes the 
difference between the average ܸܵܫ௧ in the five days after and before the release  
day20. ܣܸܵܫሺ2ሻ is the variable using a two-day window. If the bidding information 
on the release day has attracted the attention of investors, these two variables are 
expected to increase. The definition here is different from that in Da et al. (2011), 
who use the average SVI in the IPO week less the median value of SVI during the 
prior 8 weeks. My analysis constructs these variable to quantify whether the release 
of bidding information boost investors’ sentiment21. I include these two variables in 
the regressions at both the bid-level and the issue-level analyses. Results are 
presented in Table 8.  
 
[Insert Table 8] 
 
After controlling for the effect of increased investors’ attention, the coefficients of 
past performance are still significant across all model specifications. The 
                                                       
20 The five days after the release day include the day of release day. 
21 The sentiment variable following Da et al. (2011) cannot be constructed as a control variable in my main 
tests because the SVI data is mostly not available pre‐IPO. First, company name and ticker from the CSRC may 
not be used by individual investors to search for the stock in Baidu. Second, similar to Google, Baidu truncates 
the output and returns missing values for SVIs with insufficient searches. But the exact criteria used by Baidu 
to determine the truncation threshold are not available. 
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insignificant effect of abnormal search volume is consistent with the slight change   
in investors’ attention as shown in Figure 2. 
 
6.3 High bids and low bids 
 
Performance persistence may arise from persistent behaviors of institutional 
investors. If IPOs are in general underpriced, persistent submissions of high bids    
will create an average positive performance. At the same time, if other investors 
consistently submit very low bids, they will obtain a low performance on the    
average. Under these circumstances, the performance gap may exist between these 
two groups of investors. But this gap is not due to the information differences but 
driven by their distinct bidding strategies. To rule out this possibility, I construct     
two variables. Highbid is a dummy equal to one if the bid is above the midpoint of 
the filing range. Lowbid is a dummy equal to one if the bid is below the lower limit 
of the filing range22. These two variables are included in the bid-level regression. In 
addition, two corresponding variables at issue-level, Highbid_ave and Lowbid_ave, 
defined as average of Highbid and Lowbid for each subscriber in an IPO    
respectively, are also constructed. I include these two variables in the regression 
models for predicting IPO initial and subsequent returns. As shown in Table 9, the 
inclusion of these variables does not significantly change the effect of past 
performance on current performance and IPO returns. 
 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
6.4 Industry-specific expertise 
 
Another interesting issue is whether the performance gap is caused by the 
institutional investors who have industry-specific expertise. For these investors, the 
number of their participations in a particular industry should be positively     
correlated with their overall performance. I construct one variable Ind_N as the 
number of past participations in the same industry as that of the current issue. The 
                                                       
22 The definition of Low bid as bids lower than the midpoint of the filing range will cause perfect 
multicollinearity problem. 
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results, as reported in Table 10, indicate that the persistent performance is unlikely to 
be caused by industry-specific expertise but more likely by generic skills and 
knowledge. 
 
[Insert Table 10] 
 
6.5 Robustness checks 
 
In this section, I present the results of a robustness check. This robustness check 
builds on an alternative definition of two-period in which the sample is divided into 
two periods with equal durations instead of equal number of issues in each period. 
The new definition results in 286 issues in the first period and 191 issues in the  
second period. Although the numbers of IPOs in the two periods are different from 
those in my main analyses, the results under the new definition still offer consistent 
evidence to support my hypotheses (as reported in Table 11). 
 
[Insert Table 11] 
 
Chapter 7. Conclusion, limitations and directions for future works 
 
By using full bid information for 477 bookbuilt IPOs in China, this study     
documents the first evidence of performance persistence for institutional investors   
in the IPO market. Specifically, I find that the performance of institutional investors 
persists from period to period. This pattern can still be observed for institutional 
investors with good past performance, whereas not for ones with bad past 
performance. I further construct an index capturing past performance of     
institutional investors who participate in an IPO and find it to be informative of the 
IPO’s initial and subsequent returns. These results are robust after ruling out the 
influences of underwriters and including numerous control variables such as the 
conventional predictors of initial returns, year and industry dummies. I attribute the 
underlying causes of the observed performance persistence to  the existence of 
information heterogeneity among institutional investors. Specifically, I identify four 
features of institutional investors with good past performance, which are consistent 
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with the hypothesis that investors with good past performance are relatively more 
informed than those with bad past performance. These features are: (1) they are    
more likely to subscribe to IPOs with high underpricing; (2) they display stronger  
bid shaving ability; (3) their bids contribute to a more elastic demand curve and (4) 
they show a lower tendency of naïve reinforcement learning. 
 
My study contributes to the existing literature and has practical implications. Firstly, 
my study extends the analysis on performance persistence of institutional investors 
from the secondary market to the IPO market. Secondly, my evidence on the 
existence of performance persistence confirms the existence of information 
heterogeneity among institutional investors in the IPO market, which enhances our 
understanding of the information environment of IPO market. Thirdly, the past 
performance of institutional investors may serve as a predictor of an IPO’s initial   
and subsequent returns. This new predictor can provide sophisticated investors with 
valuable information to reap superior returns in the immediate aftermarket of new 
issues. Lastly, this study also suggests the “hybrid” method proposed by the recent 
studies on IPO methods appears to be effective in soliciting information from 
informed investors even in the presence of uninformed investors. 
 
My study also suffers from several limitations that invite future works. Firstly,      
long-run performance of new issues has not been investigated yet. My sample    
period ends at Oct 2012. The trading data so far does not allow me to measure       
long-run performance. When more trading data are available, I will conduct 
additional analysis to further investigate whether the shares subscribed to by 
informed investors will maintain superior performance or experience price reversal 
in the long run.  
 
Secondly, the detailed information on the trading transactions of institutional 
investors is not available. This has prevented me from conducting research on the 
several important issues on the aftermarket dynamics such as the flipping behaviors 
and investment horizons of different institutional investors in the post IPO market. 
Evidence on these issues can further enhance our understanding on the information 
possessed by different investors in IPO market. 
42 
 
 
Thirdly, Chemmanur et al. (2012) investigate whether value creation by investment 
banks in acquisitions arise primarily from reputation, culture, and other institutional 
strengths of a given investment bank or from the human capital accumulated by the 
individual investment bankers that have been employed by that bank. In my    
research, the observed persistence can also be driven by the organizational capital 
where the institutional investors were employed (organizational-specific) or 
alternatively by the individuals such as mutual fund managers (individual-specific). 
To address this question in the future, more detailed data on the turnover and 
performance of mutual fund managers are needed to be collected. Then the 
performance explained by organizations and individuals can be identified and 
compared. 
 
Fourthly, Hoberg (2007) investigates the coverage of analysts on the IPOs which     
are underwritten by underwriters of high underpricing and low underpricing 
respectively. The evidence shows that underwriters of high underpricing can    
provide better quality service in terms of analyst coverage and so on. In my context, 
it will also be interesting to explore whether the good performers also have better 
performance in other non-IPO investments. I will also work on this issue in my 
further work. Specifically, I will collect the data of mutual funds (because only data 
of mutual funds in the secondary market is available) and construct variables that 
capture the performance of the good performance in the secondary market rather    
than IPO market. 
 
Fifthly, although some efforts have been made to pinpoint the sources underlying    
the observed performance persistence, the precise roots have not been thoroughly 
uncovered. Specifically, I attribute the persistence phenomenon to the information 
heterogeneity among institutional investors, but I cannot fully differentiate whether 
the performance persistence is due to superior skills or private information of the 
institutional investor. The distinction between these two sources is difficult. 
Nevertheless, I will collect more specific data that are related to this issue and  
conduct more additional analysis in my future work. 
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Sixthly, the inclusion of the perspective on governance will improve the quality of 
the paper, but the current version does not contain such an analysis. As the   
theoretical linkage between corporate governance and performance persistence has 
not yet been addressed by prior literature. I’ll first figure out the theoretical 
mechanisms in my future work and then collect more relevant data to examine the 
relation between corporate governance and performance persistence.  
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
Variables Definitions 
General   
IR Initial return, equal to the market price adjustment from offer 
price to the closing price on the issue date 
Adj-IR Market adjusted initial return, equal to the initial return adjusted 
by market return (CSI 300) 
BHAR10d 10-day buy-and-hold abnormal return using the CSI 300 return 
as the market benchmark 
BHAR3m 3-month buy-and-hold abnormal return using the CSI 300 return 
as the market benchmark 
BHAR6m 6-month buy-and-hold abnormal return using the CSI 300 return 
as the market benchmark 
BHAR1y 1-year buy-and-hold abnormal return using the CSI 300 return as 
the market benchmark 
Perf A performance measure, equal to initial return if the bid is no 
less than the offer price, zero otherwise 
Part A dummy equal to one if the investor participates in issues in the 
second period 
Perf1 (Perf2) The average of Perf in the first period (second period) for each 
investor 
Win1 (Win2) Winning probability in the first period (second period) for each 
investor 
Alloc Allocation probability in the first period for each investor 
PastPerf Bid-size weighted average of Perf1 for institutional investors 
that participate in an IPO 
Controls   
Mkt15 Average market return (CSI 300) for the 15-trading days 
preceding the issue date 
PriorIR30 Average of initial return of IPOs issued in the 30 days before the 
issue date 
Overhang Number of shares retained by the entrepreneur divided by 
number of shares to be sold 
PriceRev Offer price relative to the midpoint of filing range 
Amount Natural logarithm of the filing amount (number of shares to be 
sold in 10 thousand) 
InvPrice Equal to the reciprocal of the filing midpoint 
UwCap Natural logarithm of capital raised by the underwriter in the last 
year 
Age Number of years from the establishment date to issue date 
Size Natural logarithm of the total assets before the IPO year 
ROA Total profit divided by total assets 
Lev Total debt divided by total assets
SOE A dummy equal to one if the firm is state-owned enterprise 
based on the ultimate controller 
ChiNext A dummy equal to one if the IPO is listed in the ChiNext market 
of China 
Additional   
Entry_G  
 
Oversubscription rate of investors with good (bad) past  
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(Entry_B) performance 
Bidpremium_
G 
(Bidpremium_
B) 
Bid-size weighted average of bids relative to the midpoint of the 
filing range from institutional investors with good (bad) past 
performance 
Elas Elasticity of the demand curve in the bids for an IPO 
Order Participation order for each investor 
Discount The offer price relative to the market clearing price 
Connect_N The number of participations in the first period that involves the 
same pair of underwriter and investor 
Ave_connect_
N The average of Connect_N for all subscribers in an IPO 
ASVI(5) / 
ASVI(2) 
The difference between the log of average search volume index 
during the five / two days after and before the release day of 
bidding information 
Highbid A dummy equal one if the bid is above the midpoint of filing 
range 
Lowbid A dummy equal one if the bid is below the lower filing range 
Highbid_ave Average Highbid at issue-level 
Lowbid_ave Average Lowbid at issue-level 
Ind_N The number of past participations in the same industry as that of 
the current issue 
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Figure 1 Number of IPOs and average initial returns by calendar month 
 
 
 
The figure shows the number of IPOs and average initial returns by calendar month over    
the sample period in this study, Nov 2010 to Oct 2012. The sample consists of 477 issues in 
24 calendar months with the average initial return of 24% indicated by the dashed line. 
Histograms and the solid line show the number of issues and average initial returns by    
month, respectively. 
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Figure 2 Average search volume index (SVI) around the release day of participation 
information 
 
 
 
The figure show the average search volume index (SVI) around the release day (day 0) of 
institutional investors’ bidding and participation information. The solid line in the figure 
indicates the average log of SVI on day t. 
5.2
5.4
5.6
5.8
6
6.2
6.4
6.6
6.8
7
‐5 ‐4 ‐3 ‐2 ‐1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Log(SVI)
48 
 
Table 1 A typical timeline for the pre-market of IPOs conducted in China 
 
Day Event 
T-6 Announcement of the institutional and retail tranche arrangement 
T-5 ~ T-3 Road show and bid collection for the institutional tranche 
T-2 Issuer and underwriter determine the offer price 
T-1 Announcement of the updated prospectus including offer price 
T  Subscription of the retail tranche 
T+1 The allocation of the institutional tranche is determined 
T+2 Announcement of allocation result for the institutional tranche (the 
detailed bid information is released). The allocation of the retail 
tranche is determined by lottery. 
T+3 Announcement of allocation results for the retail tranche 
T+N Listing day 
 
In a typical process of bookbuilt IPOs in China, the information is required to be released   
by the underwriter and issuer through the announcement files. As new shares are divided  
into institutional and retail tranches, the subscription processes for these two groups of 
investors proceed separately. The day T is the subscription day for retail investors. On day 
T+N, the new shares are officially traded. There is approximately ten days between these   
two days. The full bid information used in this study is based on the announcement of 
institutional allocation results on day T+2.
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Table 2 Summary statistics 
 
Panel A             
Initial return N Mean Q25 Med Q75 S.D. 
Total 477 0.24  0.00  0.16  0.35  0.33  
2010 43 0.43  0.15  0.31  0.57  0.41  
2011 281 0.21  -0.03  0.14  0.32  0.30  
2012 153 0.23  -0.01  0.17  0.34  0.33  
First period 239 0.24  -0.02  0.15  0.35  0.35  
Second period 238 0.24  0.01  0.18  0.36  0.31  
CSRC industry             
Agriculture 7 0.24  0.07  0.17  0.31  0.28  
Mining 8 0.42  0.08  0.13  0.39  0.74  
Manufacturing 339 0.21  -0.03  0.14  0.32  0.32  
Utilities 2 0.26  0.09  0.26  0.43  0.24  
Construction 13 0.40  0.15  0.23  0.56  0.46  
Transportation 6 0.32  0.07  0.37  0.54  0.27  
IT 59 0.25  0.05  0.21  0.45  0.29  
Wholesale 14 0.25  0.03  0.24  0.44  0.31  
Finance 4 0.34  0.13  0.29  0.55  0.26  
Real estate 0 - - - - - 
Social Services 17 0.22  0.07  0.21  0.32  0.24  
Communication 8 0.42  0.25  0.38  0.51  0.22  
Comprehensive 0 - - - - - 
 
The sample for issue-level consists of 477 IPOs. The sample is divided into two parts with 
239 and 238 IPOs respectively. Initial return is equal to the market price adjustment from 
offer price to the closing price on the issue date.
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel B Issue-level variable (2nd period) 
 N Mean Q25 Med Q75 S.D. 
Adj-IR 238 0.24  0.01  0.18  0.37  0.31  
BHAR10d 238 0.19  -0.03  0.12  0.30  0.33  
BHAR3m 238 0.12  -0.08  0.07  0.28  0.30  
BHAR6m 238 0.13  -0.13  0.03  0.31  0.39  
BHAR1y 238 0.21  -0.16  0.03  0.41  0.69  
PastPerf 238 0.16  0.15  0.16  0.17  0.02  
Mkt15 238 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
PriorIR30 238 0.26  0.14  0.22  0.40  0.15  
Overhang 238 0.77  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.05  
PriceRev 238 -0.12  -0.22  -0.11  -0.03  0.15  
Amount 238 8.13  7.60  7.93  8.52  0.83  
InvPrice 238 0.06  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.03  
UwCap 238 10.46  10.18  10.64  10.93  0.62  
Age 238 11.05  8.06  10.76  13.94  4.76  
Size 238 20.31  19.59  20.00  20.84  1.18  
ROA 238 0.18  0.12  0.16  0.23  0.10  
Lev 238 0.45  0.32  0.46  0.56  0.17  
SOE 238 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 
ChiNext 238 0.44  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.50  
 
The issue-level sample in the second period consists of 238 IPOs. Adj-IR is the market 
adjusted initial return using the CSI 300 return as the market benchmark. BHAR10d, 
BHAR3m, BHAR6m, BHAR1y are the buy-and-hold abnormal returns using the windows 
of ten-days, three-month, six-month and one-year, respectively. The index, PastPerf, is 
constructed as the bid-size weighted average of past performance for all the institutional 
investors in the current issue. Mkt15 is average market return (CSI 300) for the 15-trading 
days preceding the issue date. PriorIR30 is average initial return of IPOs issued in the 30 
days before the issue date. Overhang is shares retained by the entrepreneur divided by    
shares filed. PriceRev is offer price relative to the midpoint of filing range. Amount is   
natural logarithm of the number of shares to be sold in ten thousand. InvPrice equals to the 
reciprocal of the filing midpoint. UwCap denotes natural logarithm of capital raised by the 
underwriter in the last year. Age is the number of years from the establishment day to the 
listing day. Size is the natural logarithm of the total assets before the IPO year. ROA is total 
profit divided by total assets. Lev is total debt divided by total assets. SOE is a dummy     
equal to one if the firm is state-owned enterprise based on the ultimate controller. ChiNext  
is a dummy equal to one if the IPO is listed on the ChiNext market of China. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel C                        
  Full sample  Good past performance  
Bad past  
performance  Difference 
 N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. mean(good)-mean(bad)
Perf1 648 0.17 0.15 324 0.28 0.13 324 0.06 0.05 0.22*** 
Perf2 648 0.17 0.18 324 0.19 0.18 324 0.15 0.17 0.04*** 
Perf (full period) 36591 0.12 0.28 17348 0.15 0.31 19243 0.09 0.24 0.06*** 
Perf (first period) 19541 0.13 0.28 8859 0.19 0.33 10682 0.09 0.22 0.10*** 
Perf (second period) 17050 0.11 0.28 8489 0.12 0.29 8561 0.10 0.27 0.02*** 
 
The investor-level sample consists of 648 investors. They are divided into two subsamples with good (bad) performance in the first period. Each subsample 
has 324 investors. The performance is measured at the bid-level, Perf is equal to the initial return if the bid is not less than offer price, zero otherwise. Perf1 
and Perf2 are defined as the average of Perf in the first and second periods indicating the performance for each period. The bid-level sample consists of         
36591 bids in the full period and 19541 and 17050 in the first and second periods. The difference in performance is significant at the 0.01 level in both the 
investor-level and bid-level samples, indicated by ***.
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel D              
  Total Securities Funds Trust and insurance 
SOE financial 
firm Recommended
Average Perf1  0.17 0.16  0.19  0.14  0.17  0.10  
Average Perf2  0.17 0.15  0.21  0.09  0.13  0.10  
# of investors  648 125 359 95 17 52 
% of investors  100 19.29  55.40  14.66  2.62  8.02  
# of bids (full period)  36591 9926 18629 5161 1506 1369 
# of bids (first period)  19541 5494 9281 3034 972 760 
# of bids (second period)  17050 4432 9348 2127 534 609 
# of bids per issue (full period)  76.71  20.81  39.05  10.82  3.16  2.87  
# of bids per issue (first period)  81.76  22.99  38.83  12.69  4.07  3.18  
# of bids per issue (second period)  71.64  18.62  39.28  8.94  2.24  2.56  
% of bids with allocation (full period)  18.36  17.42  17.46  24.03  16.53  18.12  
% of bids (full period)  100 27.13  50.91  14.10  4.12  3.74  
% of bids (first period)  100 28.12  47.50  15.53  4.97  3.89  
% of bids (second period)  100 25.99  54.83  12.48  3.13  3.57  
 
The investor-level sample consists of five types of investors, security companies, funds, trust/insurance, SOE financial firms and other investors that are 
recommended by the underwriter to be included in the bidding process.
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Table 3 Performance persistence in the investor-level analysis 
 
Panel A OLS 
 Full sample Good Bad 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Perf2 Perf2 Perf2 Perf2 Perf2 Perf2 
Perf1 0.154*** 0.101** 0.188*** 0.123* -0.123 -0.216 
 (3.17) (2.03) (2.66) (1.71) (-0.66) (-1.16) 
Intercept 0.143*** 0.138*** 0.134*** 0.146*** 0.160*** 0.150*** 
 (13.53) (9.11) (6.29) (5.27) (9.62) (7.09) 
type no yes no yes no yes 
N 648 648 324 324 324 324 
adj./Ps. R-sq 0.015 0.067 0.016 0.055 -0.002 0.057 
 
The investor-level analysis is conducted using OLS estimation. The dependent variable is the value-weighted average of performances in the second period. 
Perf1 is the average performances in the first period. The sample is further divided into two parts by the average performance in the first period. The “good” 
group refers to investors with good performance in the first period, while the “bad” group refers to ones with bad past performance. Values of the t-statistic   
are calculated by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and reported in brackets. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel B Heckman 
   Full sample Good Bad 
 stage 1  stage 2 stage 2 stage 2 stage 2 stage 2 stage 2 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Part  Perf2 Perf2 Perf2 Perf2 Perf2 Perf2 
Perf1 0.344  0.113** 0.0995** 0.148** 0.129* -0.271 -0.240 
 (1.12)  (2.28) (1.99) (2.12) (1.77) (-1.44) (-1.28) 
Win1 -0.146        
 (-0.91)        
Alloc -0.751***        
 (-5.34)        
mills lambda   -0.149*** -0.0372 -0.148** 0.107 -0.164*** -0.171** 
   (-4.49) (-0.46) (-2.37) (0.76) (-4.34) (-2.12) 
Intercept 0.941***  0.220*** 0.153*** 0.212*** 0.104* 0.251*** 0.216*** 
 (7.92)  (10.38) (4.53) (5.73) (1.73) (8.57) (5.70) 
type yes  no yes no yes no yes 
N 858  648 648 324 324 324 324 
adj./Ps. R-sq 0.08  0.043 0.066 0.033 0.054 0.043 0.062 
 
The investor-level analysis is conducted using Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation. Part is a dummy if the investor appears in the second period. Perf1 is   
the average performance in the first period. Win1 is the probability of submitting bids that are no less than the offer price in the first period. Alloc is the 
allocation probability in the first period. In the first stage of the Heckman model, Perf1, Win1, Alloc and investor type dummies are included in the selection 
equation. Mills lambda is calculated by the predicted dependent variable of model (1) using Probit estimation. Values of the t-statistic are calculated by 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and reported in brackets. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 4 Performance persistence in the bid-level analysis 
 
  Full sample  Good  Bad 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Perf Perf Perf Perf Perf Perf Perf Perf Perf 
Perf1 0.133*** 0.139*** 0.119*** 0.161*** 0.172*** 0.0955*** -0.0347 -0.0327 0.0840 
 (4.59) (4.49) (4.55) (4.32) (4.28) (4.54) (-0.30) (-0.26) (0.96) 
Mkt15  0.234 -0.347  -1.194 -1.067  1.660 0.409 
  (0.03) (-0.07)  (-0.16) (-0.21)  (0.26) (0.08) 
PriorIR30  0.119 0.0796  0.153 0.0984  0.0892 0.0606 
  (0.70) (0.58)  (0.86) (0.71)  (0.55) (0.44) 
Overhang  0.656 0.501  0.787 0.601  0.533 0.404 
  (0.96) (1.05)  (1.08) (1.22)  (0.84) (0.87) 
PriceRev  -0.524 -0.525**  -0.551 -0.527**  -0.499 -0.523** 
  (-1.48) (-2.50)  (-1.50) (-2.55)  (-1.46) (-2.44) 
Amount  -0.0336 -0.0294  -0.0300 -0.0281  -0.0374 -0.0305 
  (-0.78) (-0.66)  (-0.67) (-0.61)  (-0.90) (-0.69) 
InvPrice  1.538 1.334  1.671 1.471*  1.417 1.201 
  (1.32) (1.64)  (1.40) (1.81)  (1.25) (1.44) 
UwCap  -0.0200 -0.0168  -0.0163 -0.0126  -0.0231 -0.0202 
  (-0.89) (-1.00)  (-0.74) (-0.73)  (-1.00) (-1.17) 
Age  -0.00261 -0.000617  -0.00301 -0.000834  -0.00227 -0.000531 
  (-0.91) (-0.23)  (-1.02) (-0.32)  (-0.82) (-0.20) 
Size  0.0166 -0.00481  0.0112 -0.00640  0.0212 -0.00398 
  (0.56) (-0.11)  (0.37) (-0.15)  (0.72) (-0.09) 
ROA  -0.291 -0.344  -0.350 -0.395*  -0.236 -0.297 
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  (-1.10) (-1.60)  (-1.21) (-1.68)  (-0.98) (-1.51) 
Lev  -0.362 -0.515**  -0.377 -0.545**  -0.347 -0.486** 
  (-1.11) (-2.33)  (-1.11) (-2.50)  (-1.10) (-2.18) 
SOE  0.0453 0.0407  0.0403 0.0381  0.0498 0.0426 
  (0.53) (0.66)  (0.48) (0.65)  (0.58) (0.65) 
ChiNext  0.0875** 0.0804**  0.100*** 0.0931***  0.0755** 0.0675** 
  (2.34) (2.43)  (2.59) (2.76)  (2.05) (2.04) 
Intercept 0.0895*** -0.237 0.446 0.0824*** -0.310 0.302 0.103*** -0.155 0.327 
 (4.23) (-0.38) (0.70) (4.81) (-0.47) (0.40) (3.64) (-0.25) (0.46) 
Type no no yes  no no yes  no no yes 
Industry no no yes no no yes no no yes 
Year no no yes  no no yes  no no yes 
N 17050 17050 17050  8489 8489 8489  8561 8561 8561 
Adj. R-sq 0.003 0.137 0.290  0.003 0.147 0.310  -0.000 0.126 0.268 
 
The bid-level analysis is conducted using the sample of IPOs in the second period consisting of 17050 bids in the full sample, 8489 bids from investors in the 
“good” group and 8561 from investors in the “bad” group. The dependent variable is Perf, equal to the initial return if the bid is no less than the offer price, 
zero otherwise. The average performance of institutional investors in the first period, Perf1, is the variable of interest. Several control variables are considered. 
Mkt15 is the average market return (CSI 300) for the 15-trading days preceding the issue date. PriorIR30 is the average of initial return of IPOs issued in the 
30 days before the issue date. Overhang is shares retained by the entrepreneur divided by shares filed. PriceRev is the offer price relative to the midpoint of 
filing range. Amount is the natural logarithm of the number of shares to be sold in ten thousand. InvPrice equals to the reciprocal of the filing midpoint.     
UwCap denotes natural logarithm of capital raised by the underwriter in the last year. Age is the number of years from the establishment date to issue date.  
Size is the natural logarithm of the total assets before the IPO year. ROA is the total profit divided by total assets. Lev is the total debt divided by total assets. 
SOE is a dummy equal to one if the firm is state-owned enterprise based on the ultimate controller. ChiNext is a dummy equal to one if the IPO is listed on   
the ChiNext market of China. Investor type dummies, industry dummies and year dummies are included in some model specifications. The values of                         
t-statistics in brackets are calculated by standard errors clustered on both investor and calendar month. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. 
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Table 5 Past performance and subsequent returns 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)  (5) (6)   (7) (8)  (9)  (10) 
 IR IR  Adj-IR Adj-IR BHAR10d BHAR10d  BHAR3m BHAR3m BHAR6m BHAR1y
PastPerf 3.211*** 2.536***  3.166*** 2.483*** 3.334*** 2.596***  3.917*** 3.027*** 1.915 2.194 
 (3.07) (2.76)  (3.02) (2.72) (3.34) (3.04)  (3.70) (2.91) (1.37) (1.14) 
Mkt15  22.98***   23.11***  31.64***   9.766 11.74 22.67* 
  (3.73)   (3.78)  (4.41)   (1.47) (1.45) (1.95) 
PriorIR30  0.534***   0.537***  0.377**   0.202 0.253 -0.0543 
  (4.38)   (4.42)  (2.57)   (1.51) (1.50) (-0.26) 
Overhang  0.371   0.335  0.144   0.198 0.836 -0.156 
  (0.92)   (0.83)  (0.38)   (0.46) (1.29) (-0.19) 
PriceRev  -0.678***  -0.661***  -0.647***  -0.370* -0.675*** -0.290 
  (-4.17)   (-4.11)  (-3.53)   (-1.93) (-2.83) (-0.95) 
Amount  -0.200***  -0.202***  -0.192***  -0.106* -0.139* 0.0434 
  (-3.56)   (-3.60)  (-3.23)   (-1.82) (-1.79) (0.20) 
InvPrice  6.846***   6.841***  6.020***   3.558*** 4.309*** 2.839 
  (8.43)   (8.53)  (6.29)   (4.76) (4.54) (1.39) 
UwCap  0.00234   0.00260  -0.0236   -0.0194 -0.00271 -0.0190 
  (0.08)   (0.09)  (-0.70)   (-0.68) (-0.07) (-0.25) 
Age  -0.00393   -0.00415  -0.00611   -0.00645* -0.00729 -0.0201*
  (-1.16)   (-1.23)  (-1.60)   (-1.75) (-1.59) (-1.84) 
Size  0.0455   0.0482  0.0372   -0.0131 -0.0351 -0.115 
  (0.99)   (1.05)  (0.82)   (-0.27) (-0.52) (-0.82) 
ROA  0.118   0.111  -0.137   -0.152 -0.428 -0.545 
  (0.54)   (0.50)  (-0.53)   (-0.54) (-1.08) (-0.66) 
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Lev  -0.356**   -0.361**  -0.362**   -0.258 -0.588*** -0.948* 
  (-2.06)   (-2.11)  (-1.97)   (-1.54) (-2.62) (-1.93) 
SOE  -0.0768   -0.0753  -0.114   -0.0248 0.0421 -0.131 
  (-1.11)   (-1.09)  (-1.46)   (-0.34) (0.40) (-1.04) 
ChiNext  -0.00878   -0.00897  -0.0499   -0.00691 -0.0447 0.0796 
  (-0.22)   (-0.23)  (-1.09)   (-0.17) (-0.85) (1.01) 
Intercept -0.281* 0.100  -0.274* 0.0870 -0.347** 0.965  -0.512*** 1.270 1.844* 3.418** 
 (-1.70) (0.13)  (-1.66) (0.11) (-2.20) (1.21)  (-3.13) (1.59) (1.82) (2.24) 
Industry no yes   no yes  no yes   no yes  yes  yes 
Year no yes   no yes  no yes   no yes  yes  yes 
N 238 238   238 238  238 238   238 238  238  238 
Adj. R-sq 0.037 0.441   0.036 0.442  0.035 0.380   0.062 0.269  0.274  0.176 
 
This issue-level analysis is conducted using the sample of 238 IPOs in the second period. The dependent variables are initial return (IR), the market adjusted 
initial return using the CSI 300 return as the market benchmark (Adj-IR), the buy-and-hold abnormal returns using the windows of ten-days (BHAR10d),   
three-month (BHAR3m), six-month (BHAR6m) and one-year (BHAR1y), respectively. The index, PastPerf, is constructed as the bid-size weighted average  
of past performance for all the institutional investors in the bidding process. Mkt15 is the average market return (CSI 300) for the 15-trading days preceding 
the issue date. PriorIR30 is the average of initial return of IPOs issued in the 30 days before the issue date. Overhang is shares retained by the entrepreneur 
divided by shares filed. PriceRev is the offer price relative to the midpoint of the filing range. Amount is the natural logarithm of the number of shares sold in 
ten thousand. InvPrice equals to the reciprocal of the filing midpoint. UwCap denotes the natural logarithm of capital raised by the underwriter in the last year. 
Age is the number of years from the establishment date to the issue day. Size is the natural logarithm of the total asset before the IPO year. ROA is the total 
profit divided by total assets. Lev is the total debt divided by total assets. SOE is a dummy equal to one if the firm is state-owned enterprise based on the 
ultimate controller. ChiNext is a dummy equal to one if the IPO is listed on the ChiNext market of China. The values of t-statistics in the brackets are       
calculated by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 6 Information heterogeneity among institutional investors 
 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  IR IR IR BHAR3m BHAR3m BHAR3m
Entry_G 0.0914**  0.0668* 0.146***  0.117** 
 (2.16)  (1.65) (2.80)  (2.31) 
Entry_B 0.0612  0.000451 0.0112  -0.0623 
 (1.30)  (0.01) (0.18)  (-1.06) 
Bidpremium_G   1.175*** 0.965**  1.512*** 1.333***
  (2.60) (2.09)  (3.10) (2.74) 
Bidpremium_B  0.685 0.511  0.600 0.444 
  (1.45) (1.07)  (1.21) (0.92) 
Intercept -0.727 -0.883 -1.211* 0.376 0.0692 -0.224 
 (-0.89) (-1.23) (-1.66) (0.48) (0.10) (-0.33) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 238 238 238 238 238 238 
Adj. R-sq 0.488 0.522 0.530 0.330 0.383 0.398 
 
Panel A presents the evidence on endogenous entry and bid premium and their associations 
with subsequent IPO returns. The dependent variable for models (1) to (3) is initial return 
(IR). The dependent variable for models (4) to (6) is the three-month buy-and-hold    
abnormal return using the CSI 300 as the benchmark (BHAR3m). Entry_G (Entry_B), 
defined as the oversubscription rate of investors with good (bad) past performance,   
represents the endogenous entry of the investors in the “good” (“bad”) group.  
Bidpremium_G (Bidpremium_B) is the average of the bids relative to the midpoint of the 
filing range from investors with good (bad) past performance. All the control variables are 
included but not shown for brevity. The values of the t-statistics in the brackets are   
calculated by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, **, *** represent significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
60 
 
Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Elas Elas Elas Elas Elas Elas 
PastPerf 5.545*** 5.244** 5.979***    
 (3.04) (2.58) (2.96)    
Entry_G    0.240** 0.230** 0.312***
    (2.53) (2.20) (2.81) 
Entry_B    -0.220** -0.261** -0.320** 
    (-2.09) (-2.21) (-2.58) 
Intercept -0.894*** -0.655 -0.669 -0.00752 0.569 0.311 
 (-2.96) (-0.68) (-0.62) (-0.13) (0.68) (0.30) 
Controls no no yes no no yes 
Industry no yes yes no yes yes 
Year no yes yes no yes yes 
N 238 238 238 238 238 238 
Adj. R-sq 0.044 0.046 0.068 0.022 0.028 0.059 
 
Panel B presents the evidence on the past performance and endogenous entry of investors 
and their associations with the elasticity of the demand curve. The dependent variable, Elas, 
is the elasticity of the demand curve in the bids of an IPO. PastPerf is the bid-size weighted 
average past performance of all institutional investors that participate in the current issue. 
Entry_G (Entry_B), defined as oversubscription rate of investors with good (bad) past 
performance, represents the endogenous entry of the investors in the “good” (“bad”) group. 
The values of the t-statistics in the brackets are calculated by heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel C (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Perf Perf Perf Perf Perf Perf 
 Full sample Good Bad 
Order -0.000562** -0.000356* -0.000524 -0.000292 -0.000567*** -0.000356**
 (-2.27) (-1.90) (-1.60) (-1.16) (-2.72) (-2.19) 
Intercept -0.246 0.459 -0.297 0.294 -0.201 0.714 
 (-0.35) (0.55) (-0.41) (0.36) (-0.30) (1.02) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Type no yes no yes no yes 
Industry no yes no yes no yes 
Year no yes no yes no yes 
N 17050 17050 8489 8489 8561 8561 
Adj. R-sq 0.135 0.285 0.144 0.306 0.127 0.266 
 
Panel C present the evidence of naïve reinforcement learning in both the full sample and 
subsamples. The dependent variable is the performance measured at the bid-level, Perf.  
Order is the participation order for each investor. All control variables are included but not 
tabulated. The values of the t-statistics in the brackets are calculated by standard errors 
clustered on both investor and calendar month. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 7 The influence of underwriters 
 
Panel A Bid-level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Discount Discount Perf Perf Perf Perf 
Perf1 0.0140 0.0108** 
0.109**
* 
0.104**
* 0.120*** 0.123*** 
 (1.49) (2.26) (3.77) (3.87) (4.39) (4.66) 
Discount   1.683***
1.417**
*   
   (3.14) (4.53)   
Connect_
N     
-
0.00527* 
-
0.00324**
     (-1.67) (-2.02) 
Intercept 0.120*** 0.715** -0.113** -0.622 0.113*** 0.292 
  (12.97) (2.17) (-2.10) (-1.00) (3.38) (0.35) 
Controls no yes no yes no yes 
Type no yes no yes no yes 
Industry no yes no yes no yes 
Year no yes no yes no yes 
N 17050 17050 17050 17050 17050 17050 
Adj. R-sq 0.000 0.382 0.335 0.434 0.009 0.288 
 
Panel A presents the influence of the underwriter in the bid-level analysis. The dependent 
variable for models (1) and (2) is Discount, the offer price relative to the market clearing 
price. The dependent variable for models (3) to (6) is the performance measure at bid-level, 
Perf. Perf1 is the average past performance for each investor. Connect_N is the number of 
participations in the first period that involves the same pair of underwriter and investor.      
The values of the t-statistics in the bracket are calculated by standard errors clustered on   
both investor and calendar month. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Panel B Issue-level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Discount Discount IR IR BHAR3m BHAR3m
PastPerf 0.746*** 0.914*** 1.656** 2.526*** 1.941** 3.024*** 
 (2.78) (3.21) (2.05) (2.82) (2.23) (2.92) 
Discount   0.974***  1.192***  
   (3.50)  (3.09)  
Ave_Connect_N   -0.0178*  -0.00535 
    (-1.81)  (-0.62) 
Intercept -0.00726 0.333 -0.112 -0.295 0.909 1.154 
  (-0.17) (1.27) (-0.16) (-0.34) (1.43) (1.34) 
Controls no yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry no yes yes yes yes yes 
Year no yes yes yes yes yes 
N 238 238 238 238 238 238 
Adj. R-sq 0.029 0.192 0.490 0.451 0.352 0.270 
 
Panel B presents the influence of the underwriter in the issue-level analysis. The dependent 
variable for models (1) and (2) is Discount, the offer price relative to the market clearing 
price. The dependent variable for models (3) and (4) is initial return. For models (5) and (6), 
the dependent variable is the three-month buy-and-hold abnormal return. PastPerf is the    
bid-size weighted past performance for all the investors in the current issue.   
Ave_Connect_N is the average of Connect_N for all subscribers in an IPO. The values of  
the t-statistics in the bracket are calculated by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
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Table 8 Investors’ attention 
 
  bid-level  issue-level 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Perf Perf  IR IR BHAR3m BHAR3m 
Perf1 0.103*** 0.103***      
 (3.76) (3.75)      
PastPerf    1.870** 1.810** 2.341** 2.166** 
    (2.35) (2.28) (2.42) (2.27) 
ASVI(5) -0.00778   0.00928  0.0117  
 (-0.35)   (0.22)  (0.26)  
ASVI(2)  0.0197   0.0244  0.0713** 
  (0.75)   (0.73)  (2.32) 
Intercept 1.452** 1.378**  0.818 0.793 2.041*** 1.966*** 
 (2.50) (2.31)  (1.51) (1.49) (3.39) (3.36) 
Controls yes yes  yes yes yes yes 
Type yes yes  - - - - 
Industry yes yes  yes yes yes yes 
Year yes yes  yes yes yes yes 
N 16512 16512  231 231 231 231 
Adj. R-sq 0.184 0.186  0.399 0.401 0.245 0.264 
 
The bid-level analysis is conducted using all the bids in the second period with the 
performance measure as the dependent variable. Perf1 is the average past performance for 
each investor in the first period. The issue-level analysis uses IPOs in the second period. 
PastPerf is the bid-size weighted average past performance of subscribers in the bidding 
process. ASVI(5) and ASVI(2) are the abnormal search volume indexes calculated using       
5-day and 2-day windows after and before the release day. Missing values of ASVI make   
the sample size at the bid-level drop from 17050 to 16512 and that at the issue-level drop 
from 238 to 231. All control variables and fixed effects are included but not tabulated. The 
values of the t-statistics in the brackets at the bid-level are calculated by standard errors 
clustered on both investor and calendar month. The values of the t-statistics in the brackets 
at the issue-level are calculated by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, **, *** 
represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 9 High bids and low bids 
 
  bid-level issue-level 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Perf Perf  IR IR BHAR3m BHAR3m
Perf1 0.0639*** 0.0409***      
 (2.61) (2.81)      
PastPerf    2.850** 1.774** 3.048*** 2.107** 
    (2.51) (2.31) (2.89) (2.39) 
Highbid 0.128*** 0.153***      
 (3.70) (4.72)      
Lowbid -0.0880*** -0.154***      
 (-3.78) (-6.26)      
Highbid_ave    0.141 0.271 0.0965 0.141 
    (0.74) (1.60) (0.40) (0.68) 
Lowbid_ave    -0.0107 -0.322** -0.156 
-
0.467***
    (-0.10) (-2.46) (-1.25) (-2.94) 
Intercept 0.137*** 0.415  -0.232 0.553 -0.268 1.732** 
 (4.60) (0.74)  (-1.12) (0.83) (-1.21) (2.37) 
Controls no yes no yes no yes 
Type no yes  - - - - 
Industry no yes  no yes no yes 
Year no yes  no yes no yes 
N 17050 17050 238 238 238 238 
Adj. R-sq 0.087 0.416 0.037 0.507 0.091 0.360 
 
The bid-level analysis is conducted using all the bids in the second period with the 
performance measure as the dependent variable. Perf1 is the average past performance for 
each investor in the first period. Highbid is a dummy set equal to one if the bid is above the 
midpoint of filing range. Lowbid is a dummy set equal to one if the bid is below the lower 
limit of the filing range. The issue-level analysis uses IPOs in the second period. PastPerf is 
the bid-size weighted past performance of subscribers in the bidding process. Highbid_ave 
is average of Highbid at issue-level. Lowbid_ave is average of Lowbid at issue-level. The 
values of the t-statistics in the bracket at the bid-level are calculated by standard errors 
clustered on both investor and calendar month. The values of the t-statistics in the bracket   
at the issue-level are calculated by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, **, *** 
represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 10 Industry-specific expertise 
 
  Industry-specific expertise 
 (1) (2) 
 Perf Perf 
Perf1 0.106*** 0.119*** 
 (4.24) (4.50) 
Ind_N -0.00116** -0.000500*** 
 (-2.03) (-3.40) 
Intercept 0.129*** 0.391 
 (3.43) (0.57) 
Controls no yes 
Type no yes 
Industry no yes 
Year no yes 
N 17050 17050 
Adj. R-sq 0.021 0.289 
 
The bid-level analysis is conducted using all the bids in the second period with the 
performance measure as the dependent variable. Perf1 is the average past performance for 
each investor in the first period. Ind_N is the number of past participations in the same 
industry as that of the current issue. The values of the t-statistics in the brackets at the           
bid-level are calculated by standard errors clustered on both investor and calendar month. *, 
**, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 11 Robustness checks 
 
 Alternative definition of two-period 
 Investor-level  Bid-level  Issue-level 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Perf2 Perf2  Perf Perf  IR IR BHAR3m BHAR3m 
Perf1 0.212** 0.155*  0.161*** 0.146***      
 (2.56) (1.89)  (4.32) (3.56)      
PastPerf       4.853*** 2.643** 5.828*** 3.284** 
       (3.45) (2.42) (4.18) (2.51) 
Intercept 0.129*** 0.121***  0.0852*** 0.680  -0.484** 0.114 -0.728*** 1.568* 
 (8.74) (6.38)  (3.20) (0.96)  (-2.44) (0.15) (-3.75) (1.85) 
Type no yes   no yes   - - - - 
Controls - -  no yes  no yes no yes 
Industry - -  no yes  no yes no yes 
Year - -  no yes  no yes no yes 
N 526 526   12734 12734   191 191 191 191 
adj./Ps. R-sq 0.014 0.066   0.002 0.352   0.057 0.464 0.084 0.303 
 
The table presents a robustness check using an alternative definition of two-period. This robustness check divides the sample by the duration of the period 
resulting in 526 investors in the sample. Perf1 and Perf2 are defined as the average of Perf in the first and second periods indicating the performance for each 
period. PastPerf is the bid-size weighted average past performance of subscribers in the bidding process. At the investor-level and the issue-level, the values   
of the t-statistics in the brackets are calculated by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. At the bid-level, the values of t-statistic in the bracket at the 
bid-level are calculated by standard errors clustered on both investor and calendar month. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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